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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this case is vested in the Utah Court of
Appeals as a case properly transferred from the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4)
(1989).

Original

jurisdiction

was

in the

Supreme

Court

pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(j).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal seeking reversal of a Summary Judgment
entered

in the Fourth Judicial District Court In and For

Millard County, State of Utah.
entered

in

favor

of

Said Summary Judgment was

Plaintiffs/Respondents

and

against

Defendants/Appellants quieting title to certain placer mining
claims located in Millard County.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

WHETHER GRIFFIN'S FILING OF A "SYNOPSIS" OF INFORMA-

TION CONTAINED IN THE OFFICIAL NOTICES OF LOCATION OF
MINING

CLAIMS

RATHER

THAN

AN

ACTUAL

"COPY"

THEREOF

SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF 43 U.S.C. §1744(b).
II.

WHETHER

THERE

EXISTS

ANY

SPECIAL

CIRCUMSTANCE

EXCUSING THE FILING OF AN ACTUAL "COPY" OF THE NOTICES OF
LOCATION, AND, IF SO, WHETHER THE "SYNOPSIS" CONSTITUTES
SUFFICIENT "OTHER EVIDENCE" UNDER THE CODE OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS.
III.

WHETHER RETENTION AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RED DOME

FILINGS BY THE BLM CONSTITUTES OR EXCUSES ACTUAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FLPMA.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
43 USC §1744(b) (See Appendix 19.)
STATEMENT OF CASE
a. Nature of Case
This is an action wherein both parties seek to quiet
title to unpatented placer mining claims.

The Plaintiffs/

Appellants, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Griffin",
claim to own said claims, denominated RED DOME Placer Mining
Claims Nos. 1 through 7, and RED DOME NEW DISCOVERY Placer

Mining Claims.
ly

referred

Defendants/Appellants, hereinafter collective-

to

as "Memmotts" claim that Griffin did not

properly file Notices of Location with the Bureau of Land
Management

("BLM") in accordance with §1744 of the Federal

Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).
The parties acknowledged that if Griffin had established
title to the claims said claims were not open to "location" by
the

Memmotts

dismissal.

and

the

counter-claim

would

be

subject

to

If, however, Griffin was found to not be in

compliance with the FLPMA, the RED DOME claims were open to
location, had been located on by Memmotts, and Griffin would
have no "standing" to challenge Memmotts7 ownership because
Griffin had not filed "over" said claims.
b. Course of Proceedings and Disposition
Both sides submitted Motions for Summary Judgment on the
issues of ownerships

of the claims.

Griffin's

claims for damages were abandoned after trial.

ancillary

On September

30, 1986, the Court issued a "RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AND
SECOND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS7 MOTION FOR
SUMMARY

JUDGMENT",

denying

Griffin's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment and granting, in part, Memmotts7 Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. 561-65; See

Appendix 1 and 2 ) .

On January 2,

1987, the Trial Court issued a "RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM AND RECONSIDERATION OF RULING" setting aside
its

Summary

Judgment

in favor of Memmotts.

(R. 851-53;

Appendix 3 ) . Then, on April 20, 1987, the Court vacated both
3

prior

rulings,

determining

that

issues

of

material

fact

existed precluding Summary Judgment. (R. 925-29; Appendix 21).
The case proceeded to trial whereupon the matter was submitted
on proffer after Plaintiff rested.

The District Court entered

Judgment quieting title to said claims in favor of Griffin and
against Memmotts (R 1254-1287; Appendix 4-7).
c.
1.
Location

In

December,

of

the

(Appendix 22).
facie

evidence

(UTAH

CODE

Relevant Facts
1983,

Feather

Memmotts

Lite

Claims

filed
Nos.

1

Notices

of

through

5.

Under Utah law said recorded Notices are
of the

ANN

facts of

§40-1-10

location

(1953))

The

recited

factual

prime

therein.

recitation

therein described were undisputed and unchallenged at trial.
2.

"Griffin's" ownership of the subject claims origin-

ated with the filing of Notices of Location of claims denominated RED DOME Nos. 1 through 7 and NEW DISCOVERY (Exhibit P2, Appendix 16). Said claims were filed in 1936, 1938, 1939,
and 1950.
3.

Under the applicable provisions of the FLPMA certain

filings were required in order to preserve unpatented mining
claims.

Said

filings were required to be made prior to

October 22, 1979.
(b)

Additional Filing Requirements
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining
claims or mill or tunnel site located prior to
October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976 file in the office of the
Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the
official record of the notices of location or
4

certificate of location, including a
description of the location of the mining
claim or mill or tunnel site sufficient to
locate the claimed lands on the ground.
(Emphasis added.)
43 U.S.C. 1744(b)
4.

The "official record" of the Notices of Location is

the record maintained by law in the Millard County Recorder's
Office.
5.

(UTAH CODE ANN. §40-1-4 (1953)).
Rather than obtaining "copies" of the Notices of

Location on the "RED DOME and NEW DISCOVERY" from the Millard
County Recorder's Office and filing the same with the Bureau
as proscribed

by the FLPMAf

synopsis of said filings.

Griffin

filed

an

abbreviated

(Exhibit P-3, Appendix 17).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the terms and provisions of the FLPMA, Griffin was
required

to

file with the BLM prior to October 22, 1979

"copies" of the official Notices of Location of its mining
claims in order to preserve those claims.

Although "copies"

of said Notices were

from the Millard

readily

obtainable

County Recorder's Office, Griffin merely filed an abstract or
abbreviation thereof, which contained some of the releveant
information, but not all, and contained nubmerous errors and
ommissions.
Under special circumstances, i.e., where the official
recorders had been lost, destroyed, or were illegible, "other
evidence" is permitted to be filed.

No special circumstances

exist in this case and the C.F.R.s which purportedly permit
such

filings

cannot

legally
5

vary

the

precise

statutory

language used by Congress.

The BLM's "acceptance" (stamped

receipt thereof and noted deficiencies) does not constitute
compliance.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS UPON GRIFFIN TO
ESTABLISH ITS OWN VALID TITLE,
Griffin

is, admittedly, the senior locator.

In this

quiet title action, therefore, Griffin's title succeeds or
fails solely on a showing, by it, of the validity of its own
filings.

(Michael

v.

Salt

Lake

Inv.

P. 2d 200 (1959); Homeowners Loan
208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943); Coleman

Co.,

Corp.

9 Utah 2d 370, 345

v. Dudley,

v. Butkovich,

105 Utah

538 P.2d 188

(Utah 1975).)
Claims

may

only

be

challenged

by

junior

locators.

Therefore, in the absence of a "relocation" by Griffin on
Memmotts' FEATHER LITE Claims, Griffin's failure to comply
with §1744 leaves the claims open to location by Memmotts and
immune from challenge by Griffin.

II*
A SYNOPSIS IS NOT A "COPY* WITHIN THE
MEANING OF S1744.
The statute required Griffin to file a "copy" of the
official record of the Notice of Location.

Griffin would have

this Court ignore the plain, everyday meaning of the words

6

chosen by Congress.

Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition,

defines ''copy" as follows:
The transcript or double of an original
writing; as the copy of a patent, charter,
deed, etc.
[Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied].
Congress

did

not

choose

to

require

a

"summary"1

or

an

"abstract"2 of the official record—it required a "copy".
The United States Supreme Court has previously rejected a
claimant's effort to rewrite the plain language of the statute
to comport with what was filed rather than what was required,
noting "It is clear to us that the plain language of the
statute simply cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on
United

it."

(1985).

States

The Locke

v. Locke,

471 U.S. 84, 85 L.Ed. 2d 64, 75

Court also cautioned against attempting "to

soften the clear import of Congress' chosen words whenever a
court believes those words lead to a harsh result."

Id.

at

76.
Congress

presumably

recognized

that

a

real

property

instrument such as Notice of Location must be examined in its
entirety.

To permit the filing of parts of an instrument

1

"Summary, n. An abridgment; brief; compendium;. . ."
Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition at 1604.
2

"Abstract, n. Less quantity containing the virtue
and force of a greater quantity (citation omitted).
A
transcript is generally defined as a copy, and is more
comprehensive than an abstract. (Citations omitted) Summary
or epitome, or that which comprises or concentrates in itself
the essential qualities of a larger thing or of several things
(citations omitted)." Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition,
at 24.
7

leaves the BLM and the public in the position of the proverbial

blind

men

describing

individual parts.
instrument.
the

the

elephant

by

touching

its

The BLM and public never see the whole

Rather than specifying certain desired parts of

official

record

of

the Notice

of

Location,

Congress

specified that a copy of the official record must be filed.
Griffin inexplicably tried to second-guess what information Congress was really after, and then filed only that
limited information.
ments prepared

and

In every instance, however, the docufiled by Griffin omitted

at least the

following information that would have been apparent from a
copy of the official record:

(1) The names of the locators,

(2) the number of the locators, (3) the specific minerals
claimed, (4) the dates of amendments to the claims, and (5)
the exact quantity of acreage claimed.
In individual cases the significance of the omissions is
obvious.

For example, for the RED DOME No. 3 claim, the

document prepared and filed with BLM omitted any reference to
one lot containing

some 40 acres of land.

Thus, it was

impossible to tell from the documents filed with the BLM that
Griffin claimed such land.

In other cases the significance of

the missing information, though equally important, is less
obvious to one unfamiliar with the more arcane aspects of
mining law.

For example, the number of locators is material

to whether a claim was properly located, as there must be at
least one locator for each 20 acres embraced in the claim or
8

the entire claim is invalid.
Similarly,

the

exact

(30 U.S.C. §§35 and 36 (1976)).

acreage

claimed

in

each

irregularly

shaped lot is material to determine if the 20 acre rule has
Id.

been violated.

Or, the date of an amended location is

often necessary to establish the priority of the location.
(See e.g., R.

Gail

Tibbetts

et

al.,

43 IBLA 210, 217-19

(1979) .)
III.
A "SYNOPSIS*. EVEN IF CORRECT, IS NOT A
"COPY" OF THE NOTICE OF LOCATION AS
PROSCRIBED WITHIN THE STATUTE.
Griffin has made no proffer of evidence why actually
photographically

reproduced

"copies"

Location were not filed with the BLM.

of

the

Notices

of

Other mining claimants

from Millard County obtained photo or xeroxed copies of their
Notices of Location and timely filed the same. (See, e.g.,
Appendix

13 and

14) .

Not one scintilla of evidence was

produced or proffered in an effort to establish some unusual
or special circumstance justifying filing of "other evidence"
rather than an easily and readily obtainable "copy" of the
Notice of Location on file in the County Recorder's Office.

rv.
THE "SYNOPSIS" OF THE NOTICES OF LOCATION
ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE "OTHER EVIDENCE" UNDER
43 C.F.R. S3833.0-5fi) AND SAID REGULATION
CANNOT AMEND OR VARY THE PLAIN STATUTORY
MANDATE,

9

Griffin

claims

that

the

Code

of

Federal

Regulations

permits the filing of a "synopsis" of the official record and
that its filings were, therefore, adequate to preserve its
claims•

The history of said CFR is somewhat confusing, as

evidenced by the District Court's inconsistent prior rulings
regarding the same.
On January 2, 1987, the Trial Court issued its "RULING ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION

FOR RELIEF

FROM AND RECONSIDERATION OF

RULING [of September 30, 1986]" in which the Court reversed
its earlier position and vacated its Ruling of September 30,
1986,

In vacating its earlier Ruling, the Court indicated

that it had erroneously relied on the current version of the
federal regulation defining the term "copy" as used in 43
U.S.C. §1744 (i.e., 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5 (i)), rather than the
version that was in effect at the time Griffin was required to
comply with the filing requirements of 43 U.S.C. §1744.

The

Court then quoted the version of 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) that
was in effect from March 16, 1979 through the end of the
period during which Griffin was required to file the documents
specified in 43 U.S.C. §1744(b) (viz., October 22, 1979) in
part as follows:
"Copy of the official record of the notice of
certificate of location" means a legible reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm, of the original
instrument of recordation of an unpatented mining
claim, mill or tunnel site which was or will be
filed in the local jurisdiction where the claim or
site is located or other evidence, acceptable to the
proper BLM office, of such instrument of recordation.
10

(Ruling of January 2, 1987, at 2, quoting 43 C.F.R.
§3833.0-5(i); emphasis added by Court).
The Court then proceeded to find that Griffin had in fact
submitted

"other

evidence,

acceptable

to

the

proper

BLM

office, of such instrument of recordation" and therefore, the
Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Griffin
solely as to the issue that Griffin had in fact complied with
43 U.S.C. §1744(b).

(See Ruling of January 2, 1987, at 2; R.

851-53; Appendix 3.)
At

trial

the

Court

adopted

the

same

legal

posture

determining that the BLM's "acceptance" of Griffins's filings
was, in effect, conclusive.
flawed

The Court's rulings are legally

for the following reasons:

(1) The version of 43

C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) relied upon by the Court was not yet in
effect at the time that Griffin made its filings with the BLM
relating to the Notices of Location of the RED DOME claims,
and consequently, it was error for the Court to apply the
"other evidence" exception to those filings; and (2) even if
the so-called "1979 version" of the regulation were applicable
to Griffin's RED DOME filings, those filings failed to comply
with the regulation because they did not include all of the
amended notices of locations; and
evidence"

exception

were

applicable

(3) even if the "other
in this

action, such

"other evidence" is permissible only in those rare instances
where copies of the official records are not available, e.g.,
where the official county records have been lost or destroyed;
and (4) even if BLM were to take the more expanded view and
11

permit "other evidence" when copies of the official records
are readily available, as in the present case, the quoted
regulation clearly would not comport with the express statutory language of 43 U«S.C. §1744(b), which requires "a copy of
the official record of the notice of location or certificate
of location"; and (5) even if "other evidence" were permissible despite the fact that copies of the official records
were readily available, and even if the acceptability of such
"other evidence" did not conflict with the express language of
43 U.S.C.

§1744(b), the undisputed

evidence

in this case

demonstrates that BLM has not determined that Griffin's RED
DOME filings were "acceptable",
A.
THE VERSION OF 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i)
RELIED UPON BY THE COURT WAS NOT IN EFFECT
AT THE TIME GRIFFIN FILED "OTHER EVIDENCE"
OF THE NOTICES OF LOCATION FOR ITS RED
DOME CLAIMS,
"Official record of the notice or
certificate of location" means the
official document of recordation and all
accompanying maps, papers, or other
documents filed for record with the
recorder or other officer now authorized
to record such instruments under state law
in the local jurisdiction where the
unpatented mining claim, mill site, or
tunnel site is located and any amendments
thereof which may change or alter the
location of the claim or site.
As indicated by the above-quoted version of the regulation that was in effect during the time that most of Griffin's
RED DOME filings were made, the "other evidence" exception had
not yet come into existence 1

Consequently, it was improper

12

and

legally

erroneous

for the Court to apply the "other

evidence" exception to the RED DOME filings•
B.
EVEN IF THE SO-CALLED "179 VERSION"
OF 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) WERE APPLICABLE
TO GRIFFIN'S RED DOME FILINGS, THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT APPLY THE REGULATION IN ITS
ENTIRETY.
In its Ruling of January 2, 1987 and Summary Judgment
herein, the Court quoted from the so-called "1979 version" of
43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) only so far as the regulation referred
to the "other evidence" exception.

The regulation, however,

went on to state as follows:
"Copy of the official record of the
notice [or] certificate of location" . . .
also includes an exact reproduction,
duplicate or other acceptable evidence,
except microfilm, or an amended instrument
which may change or alter the description
of the claim or site.
43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) (effective as of
March 16, 1979) (emphasis added.)
Under the above-quoted version of the regulation, Griffin's
were required to file "an exact reproduction, duplicate or
other acceptable evidence" of any Amended Notices of Locations.

Consistent with the pattern of their other filings,

however, Griffin failed to file with BLM all of the Amended
Notices of Location relating to their RED DOME claims.
example, Griffin's summary

filing

(For

for the RED DOME Placer

Claim No. 3 omitted a description of some 40.95 acres that
were claimed by a subsequent amendment.)
C.
"OTHER EVIDENCE" IS PERMISSIBLE ONLY
IN THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH COPIES OF THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE.
13

As

indicated

contained

in

43

above,
C.F.R.

the

"other

§3833.0-5(i)

evidence"

exception

has

uniformly

been

interpreted by BLM, the agency charged with the administration
of the FLPMA, to apply only in those rare instances where
copies of the official records are not available, such as
where such records have been lost or destroyed.
Cleo

May Fresh,

event,

the

(See, e.g.,

50 IBLA 363, 365 (October 16, 1980) "In any

provision

of

the

regulations

concerning

the

submission of 'other evidence' only applies when the notice of
location is no longer available"; John

J. Vikarcik,

58 IBLA

377, 379 (October 21, 1981) ; Organic Act Directive No. 79-7
(November 24, 1978) "Where a search of the local (county or
recording district) records, therefore, does not reveal the
original filing, but does show that there is reason to believe
that a recording may have been made, secondary evidence will
be accepted.") (Copies are attached as Appendix 10, 11, and
12.)
Griffin attempts to distinguish both Cleo
Vikarcik
First,

May Fresh

and

on several grounds, none of which is persuasive.
Griffin

asserts

that

in

Cleo

May Fresh,

BLM

had

returned various documents to the appellant and declared the
subject claims abandoned, and in Vikarcik,

BLM rejected the

recordation of certain mining claims held by the appellants.
Griffin then asserts that by contrast, in the present case,
BLM "accepted" Griffin's RED DOME filings.

Griffin obviously

ignores or misunderstands the distinction between the meaning
14

of the term "accept" as a legal term of art, versus its
meaning in ordinary and common usage.

In Cleo May Fresh,

the

IBLA specifically addressed this distinction and stated that
"[nor] do noncomplying submissions become 'acceptable' because
BLM takes receipt of them."

50 IBLA at 367.

Thus, merely

because BLM in the present case may have taken receipt of
Griffin's RED DOME filings in no way demonstrates that those
filings were "acceptable" to BLM.
Griffin also argues that, unlike the documents filed by
the appellants in Cleo

May Fresh

and John

J". Vikarcik,

the

documents filed by Griffin in this matter contained all of the
pertinent data necessary to satisfy the purposes and objectives of FLPMA.
two reasons.

This argument, however, is unpersuasive for

First, it is nothing more than a "substantial

compliance" argument, which was has been expressly rejected.
(Rogers

v. United

States,

575 F. Supp. 4, 8 (D. Mont. 1982)).

Second, contrary to Griffin's assertions that their RED DOME
filings contained all of the pertinent information necessary
to satisfy the purposes and objectives of FLPMA, a number of
items of information contained in the official records of the
Millard

County

recorder's

Office

are

not

contained

in

Griffin's RED DOME filings.
That

the

"other

evidence" exception

applies

only

in

instances where copies of the official records are no longer
available is reinforced by the use of the term "other evidence" in other BLM regulations.
15

For example, 43 C.F.R.

§3862.1-4 (Appendix 24) (10-1-85 Ed.) relating to lode mining
claim patent applications) provides as follows:
Evidence
records.

relating

to

destroyed

or

lost

In the event of the mining records in
any case having been destroyed by fire or
otherwise lost, a statement of the fact
should be made, and secondary evidence of
possessory title will be received, which
may consist of the statement of the
claimant, supported by those of any other
parties cognizant of the facts relative to
his location, occupancy, possession,
improvements, etc; and in such case of
lost records, any deeds, certificates of
location or purchase, or other evidence
which may be in the claimant's possession
and tend to establish his claim, should be
filed. (Emphasis added.)
The clear import of the above-quoted regulation, like Organic
Act Directive No. 79-7 (Exhibit "C" hereto), is that "other
evidence7' is permissible only in situations where the original
records

are

lost

or

destroyed.

conclusion is obvious:

The

rationale

for

this

to permit "other evidence" in situa-

tions where the original official records are available would
be in direct conflict with the purposes and objectives of
FLPMA to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date database of
information.

Instead,

it would

permit

claimants to

file

whatever documents might be in their possession, regardless of
the ready availability of the very documents that Congress
chose to require.
exception

should

For these reasons, the "other evidence"
be

applied

only

in

instances

required documents are no longer available.

16

where

the

D.
TO PERMIT "OTHER EVIDENCE" EVEN IN
SITUATIONS WHERE COPIES OF THE OFFICIAL
RECORDS ARE READILY AVAILABLE WOULD
DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH THE EXPRESS
STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF 43 U.S.C. §1744(b).
Even assuming, arguendo,

that BLM were to take a more

expansive view of 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) and permit "other
evidence" even in situations, as in this case, where copies of
the official records were readily available, such an interpretation of §3833.0-5(i) would be in direct conflict with the
express language of 43 U.S.C. §1744(b), in which Congress
specifically required "a copy of the official record of the
notice

of

location

or

certificate

of

location".

Since

regulations are inferior to the statutes under which they are
promulgated, the regulations must be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the statutory language.
Co.

v.

Industrial

Commission,

See, e.g., Utah

151 P. 2d

467, 471-73

Hotel
(Utah

1944) .
E.
THE BLM'S "ACCEPTANCE" OF GRIFFINS
FILINGS IS NOT CONCLUSIVE OF THE ISSUE OF
VALIDITY OF SAID CLAIMS.
Griffin contends that the BLM has "accepted" the "other
evidence" of the notices or certificates of location filed
with respect to the RED DOME claims, within the meaning of 43
C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i).
respects.

This contention is flawed in two salient

First, Griffin has muddled the distinction between

the meaning of the term "accept" as a legal term of art versus
its meaning in common and ordinary usage, which refers to
"taking receipt of" something.
17

See Cleo

May Fresh,

50 IBLA

363, 365

(Oct. 16, 1980)

("Nor

do noncomplying submissions

become 'acceptable7 because BLM takes receipt of them.").
Second, and related to the first point, BLM has expressly
indicated that it has not determined whether Griffin's RED
DOME filings are sufficient to comply with the recordation
requirements of 43 U.S.C. §1744(b).
The IBLA on July 12, 1986 ((Sandra Memmott on
Reconsideration) 93 IBLA 113 (1968)) vacated the BLM
decision of August 21, 1985. in its entirety. The
IBLA vacated the decision without ruling ont he
sufficiency or correctness of the decisions. As a
result, we now have no opinion as to whether or not
the documents contained in our records for the Red
Dome claims are adequate to comply with the recordation requirements of Section 314 of FLPMA and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
(Empha sis
added.)
(See Sandra

Memmott

(On Reconsideration),

93 IBLA 113 (July

24, 1986). (Appendix 23; Exhibit P-26; Appendix A)
V.
"SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE* DOES NOT VALIDATE
A DEFECTIVE FILING UNDER S1744.
Griffin relies upon certain language of §1744(c) of FLPMA
and two cases, Topaz

Berylium

Co. v.

775 (10th Cir. 1981) and Jackson

United

States,

v. Robertson,

649 F.2d

763 F.2d 1176

(10th Cir. 1985) as standing for the proposition that its
defective filings did not result in an abandonment of its
claims.

Griffin misconstrues

both the cited

language of

§1744(c) and the cases.
Section 1744(c) provides, in pertinent part:
The failure to file such instruments as
required by subsections (a) and (b) shall
18

be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the mining claim or mill or
tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not
be considered a failure to file if the
instrument is defective . . .
The statutory reference concerning a "defective" instrument
does not relate to any document filed by a party.

It refers

to the "instrument" "required by subsections (a) and (b)" of
§1744, referenced earlier in the sentence quoted above.

Only

one "instrument" is "required by subsection (b)" of §1744.

It

is the "copy of the official record of the notice of location"
for

each

claim.

Such

official

records" were

routinely

photocopied at the Millard County Recorder's office at the
pertinent time but Griffin admits that no copies of such
official record were filed for the RED DOME claims.

None of

the documents prepared and filed by Griffin purported to be a
"copy" of the record.

They were simply Griffins7 interpreta-

tion of those portions of that record that its legal counsel
thought

relevant

or

required.

"instrument" referenced

None

in the statute.

were

the

specified

Thus, the quoted

language concerning "defective" instruments is inapplicable to
resuscitate Griffin's inadequate filing.
Griffin misreads the Jackson

and Topaz

cases.

Those

cases did not deal with the effect of a claimant's failure to
file an instrument explicitly required by §1744.

The

Topaz

case developed a distinction between the effect of failure to
file something explicitly required by statute and the effect
of a failure to file certain supplemental information required
19

only by BLM's regulations.
clear:

abandonment!

In

In the former case the effect was
contrast,

the

failure

to

file

supplemental information required only by the general regulations does not result in abandonment of the claims.
at 778)

.

Jackson

simply applied the Topaz

(649 F.2d

rule, noting that

the alleged filing deficiency in that case related to information required only by the BLM's regulations rather than §1744
itself.
CONCLUSION
Because Griffin has not established a prima
compliance with the provisions

facie

case of

of the FLPMA, the

granting of Judgment should be reversed.

Court's

Griffin's failure to

timely comply with said Act left the subject ground open to
location.

Memmott's

filed Notices of Location thereon in

1984.
This Court should reverse the District Court's determination that Griffin's filings with the BLM were sufficient to
satisfy the FLPMA.

The case then should be remanded for

further proceedings consistent with said ruling,

including

determination of damages arising, if any, from Griffin's use
and occupation of Memmott's claims.
DATED this *r

day of June, 1990.

' fLuuU ti Af-*-w-«Xx.
Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellants
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

GORDON GRIFFIN and
RED DOME, INC.,

Case Number

7975

Plaintiffs,
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST AND SECOND MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs,
SANDRA MEMMOTT, et al.,
Defendants.
********

The

court,

having

reviewed

the

memoranda,

interrogatories, affidavits and other pleadings submitted to the
court, finds that plaintiffs have failed

to comply with the

filing requirements of 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(b), and therefore,
as a matter of law the nine (9) "Red Dome" mining claims that are
the subject of this action are deemed to have been abandoned
pursuant to 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(c).

The court also finds that

there remain several genuine issues of material fact relating to
the validity of defendants1 "Feather Lite" mining claims yet to
be resolved in this matter.
URCP 56(c) states that a motion for summary judgment
will be granted if:
The
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.

w

Concerning defendants1 motion for summary judgment, the
court finds that there are no issues of material fact concerning
(1) what documents were filed by plaintiffs with the Bureau of
Land Management in attempted compliance with 43 U.S.C. Section
1744(b),

and

(2)

concerning

what

documents

constituted

the

official records of the notices of location of the "Red Dome"
mining claims maintained by the Millard Court Recorder's OfficeIt is also uncontested that the documents filed by plaintiffs
were not "exact" copies of the official records of notice of
location

maintained

by

the Millard

County Recorder's Office.

Since defendants1 motion can be partially decided on these facts
alone, and since such facts are uncontested, the court finds that
there are no genuine issues of material fact relating to granting
a partial judgment on defendants1 motion for summary judgment.
Based on such uncontested facts, the court finds that defendants
are entitled to a partial judgment on their counterclaim as a
matter of law.

U.S.C. Section 1744(b) states in relevant part:

Additional filing requirements. The owner of an
unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or
tunnel site located prior to the date of approval
of this Act [enacted October 21, 1976] shall,
within the three-year period following the date of
approval of this Act [enacted October 21, 1976],
file in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the
notice of location or certificate of location,
including a description of the location of the
mining claim or mill or tunnel site sufficient to
locate the claimed lands on the ground.
If such filings are not made, U.S.C. Section 1744(c) provides the
following penalty:
Failure to file as constituting abandonment;
defective or untimely filing. The failure to file
such instruments as required by subsections (a)
o

and (b) shall be deemed conclusively to constitute
an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or
tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not be
considered a failure to file if the instrument is
defective or not timely filed for record under
other Federal laws permitting filing or recording
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record
by or on behalf of some but not all of the owners
of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site.
The

court

finds

that

the

instruments

filed

by

plaintiffs with the BLM, although timely filed, were not the type
of instruments required to be filed under U.S.C. Section 1744(b),
and therefore, plaintiffs failed to comply with 43 U.S.C. Section
1744(b).

Under

43

U.S.C.

Section

1744(b)

plaintiffs

were

required to file "cop[ies] of the official record of the notice
of location or certificate of location" of all mining claims.
(Emphasis added).

The federal regulations accompanying 43 U.S.C.

Section 1744 define "copy of the official record" as follows:
"Copy of the official record" means a legible
reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm, of
the instrument which was or will be filed under
state law in the local jurisdiction where the
claim or site is located.
It also includes and
[sic] exact
reproduction,
duplicate, except
microfilm, of an amended instrument which may
change or alter the description of the claim or
site.
43 C.F.R. Section 3833.0-5(i).
A definition of the term "reproduction" equates it with
the term "duplicate".

Random House Dictionary of the English

Language, unabridged edition (copyright 1983).

The definition of

"duplicate" most favorable to plaintiff defines a "duplicate" as
"a

document

the

same

as

another

in

essential particulars."

Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (copyright 1979).

The court

finds that even in applying this extremely lenient definition of

3

the term "copy" to plaintiffs1 filed instruments, in comparing
them to the official records, such instruments are not the same
as the official records in "essential particulars", and therefore
do not constitute "copies" of the official records of the notices
of location maintained by the Millard County Recorder's Office,
Instead,

the

court

finds

that

such

instruments

are

only

"summaries" of such official records, rather than "copies" of
such

official

records.

Additionally,

even

though

such

"summaries" contained approximately the same information as the
above mentioned official records, federal law does not recognize
the theory of "substantial compliance" in relation to 43 U.S.C.
Section 1744.

See, Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4, 8

(1982).
The court also finds that the instruments

filed by

plaintiff do not fall under the exception set out in 43 U.S.C.
Section 1744(c) in the following language:
But it shall not be considered a failure to file
if the instrument is defective...
The

court

(copies

interprets

of

the

this

official

language
records)

to

refer

that

are

to

instruments

informationally

deficient/defective for purposes of the Federal Land Policy and
Management

Act

of

1976, only

because

they were

copied

from

official records that were themselves informationally defective
for purposes of such Act.

If the instrument filed is defective

in the sense that it cannot be construed as a "copy" of the
official records, it does not fall under this exception.
Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motion for
summary

judgment in part, ruling
4

that plaintiffs' "Red Dome"
ST)*

mining claims are deemed to be abandoned pursuant to 43 U.S.C.
Section 1744(c), because of noncompliance with 43 U.S.C. Section
1744(b), and ruling that plaintiffs have no right or interest in
the subject area of interest of this lawsuit based upon their
"Red Dome" mining claims.
Concerning plaintiff's first and second motions for
summary

judgment, such motions are denied

on the basis that

plaintiffs1 Red Dome mining claims have been deemed abandoned as
explained hereinabove and also on the basis that there remain
several genuine issues of material fact relating to the validity
of defendants1 "Feather Lite" mining claims yet to be resolved in
this matter.
Defendants are requested by the court to prepare an
appropriate order pursuant to this ruling.
DATED this J?U

day of September, 1986.

RA#-?M. HARDING, JUDGE^T
cc:

Patrick J. Garver and Hal J. Pos
Dexter L. Anderson
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Tab 2

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

GORDON GRIFFIN and
RED DOME, INC.,

Case Number

Plaintiffs,

7975

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTION TO RULING, AND
REQUEST FOR ORAL
ARGUMENT AND ON
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
PROPOSED ORDER FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
SANDRA MEMMOTT, et al.,
Defendants.
********

The court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by
counsel on plaintiffs' objection to defendants' proposed
for

partial

summary

judgment

and

on

plaintiffs'

order

objection

to

ruling, rules as follows:
1)

That the court, having never received plaintiffs'

letter dated June 25, 1986, in which plaintiffs requested

oral

argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment, and finding
no copy of such letter in the file, finds that oral argument on
such motion for summary judgment was never properly

requested,

and as such, plaintiffs had no right to oral argument on such
motion.

Wherefore,

plaintiffs' motion

for

rescission

of

the

court's ruling dated September 30, 1986, and for oral argument on
defendants' motion for summary judgment filed May 28, 1986, is
denied.
2)
order
hereby

That plaintiffs' objections to defendants' proposed

for partial summary judgment are well taken.
rejects

the

proposed

order

submitted

by

The court
defendants

~7

pursuant to the court's September 30, 1986, ruling and requests
that plaintiffs submit to the court an amended order, identical
to defendants' proposed order, except for the following changes:
1.

That the language contained in paragraph 4 of

the defendants' proposed order be stricken completely from such
proposed order;
2.

That the language contained in paragraphs 2 and

3 of defendants' proposed order be replaced by new paragraphs 2
and 3 containing the following language:
2.
That defendants' motion for summary
judgment is hereby granted in part, whereas
plaintiffs' "Red Dome" mining claims are deemed
abandoned, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(c);
and
3. Plaintiffs have no right or interest in
the subject area of interest of this lawsuit based
upon their "Red Dome" mining claims.
DATED this

JL+- day of October, 1986.

1ARDING, JUDGE^-y
cc: Dexter L. Anderson
Patrick J. Garver

pursuant to the court's September 30, 1986, ruling and requests
that plaintiffs submit to the court an amended order, identical
to defendants' proposed order, except for the following changes:
1.

That the language contained in paragraph 4 of

the defendants' proposed order be stricken completely from such
proposed order;
2.

That the language contained in paragraphs 2 and

3 of defendants' proposed order be replaced by new paragraphs 2
and 3 containing the following language:
2.
That defendants' motion for summary
judgment is hereby granted in part, whereas
plaintiffs' "Red Dome" mining claims are deemed
abandoned, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(c);
and
3. Plaintiffs have no right or interest in
the subject area of interest of this lawsuit based
upon their "Red Dome" mining claims.
DATED this 2>-

cc: Dexter L. Anderson
Patrick J. Garver

day of October, 1986.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY
*******************

GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, INC.,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER 7975
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AND RECONSIDERATION OF
RULING

-VS-

SANDRA MEMMOTT, et al.,
Defendant.
********************

The

court,

having

reviewed

the

memoranda

submitted by counsel pursuant to this motion, and being fully
advised in the premises, grants plaintiffs1 motion to set aside
its ruling of September 30, 1986, pursuant to URCP 60(b)(7), for
the reason that the court relied on the current version of the
federal regulations defining "copy" as used in 43 U.S.C. Section
1744

(i.e., 43 C.F.R. Section 3833.0-5U)

), rather than the

version that was in effect at the time plaintiffs were required
to comply with the FLPMA.

The court finds that such an error in

law by the court justifies relief from the previous ruling.
Having set aside its ruling of September 30,
1986 (ruling on plaintiffs1 first and second motions for summary
judgment and defendant's motion for summary judgment), the court
in reconsidering such motions, finds that plaintiffs have complied
with the filing requirements of 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(b), which
states in relevant part:

w

"Additional filing requirements.
The owner
of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim
or mill or tunnel site located prior to the
date of approval of this Act [enacted Oct.
21, 1976] shall, within the three-year period
following the date of approval of this Act
[enacted Oct. 21, 1976], file in the office
of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a
copy of the official record of the notice of
location
or
certificate
of
location,
including a description of the location of
the mining claim or mill or tunnel site
sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the
ground."
The 1979 version of 0WgrW9KM&«^mtf&on

3833^05(1) (theT federal

regulation defining "copy of the official record") varies from the
version relied upon by the court in its previous ruling.

The 1979

version states the following:
" 'Copy of the official record of the notice
of certificate of location1 means a legible
reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm,
of the original instrument of recordation of
an unpatented mining claim, mill or tunnel
site which was or will be filed in the local
jurisdictionw, where.._J:he,__ claim or site is
locatedj^|^^
acceptable to ttig r
'
^^^y**^g < such iristrument off
lasis added.]
The court finds that plaintiffs have submitted "other evidence,
acceptable

to

the

recordation," and

proper

BLM

office,

of

such

instrument

of

therefore, the court grants partial summary

judgment on plaintiffs1 first motion for summary judgment as to
this issue only, having found that plaintiffs have complied with
43

U.S.C.

Section

1744(b).

Concerning

the

issue

of whether

plaintiffs have properly maintained their "Red Dome" mining claims
in relation to performing proper assessment work, the court finds
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
plaintiffs

have

complied

with

43

U.S.C.

Section

1744(a).

Accordingly,

the

court

grants

partial

summary

judgment

to

plaintiffs on plaintiffs' first motion for summary judgment, only
to the degree set forth hereinabove.
In addition, the court finds that there remain
genuine

issues of material

fact concerning

plaintiffs' second

motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and therefore, denies such motions.
Plaintiffs to prepare a proper order.

.i./£f-<day

DATED this A f

of Jaml^ry, 1987.

"M. HARDING, <KMt3E

cc:

Dexter L. Anderson
Hal J. Pos
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY
•**•****•*********••*

GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME,
INC- ,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NUMBER CV 7975

-vs-

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL,
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS,
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG
SANDERS,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*•••***••*••*••**•'•*•

The Court, having conducted a bench trial on this
matter finds that plaintiffs are entitled to have title to the
"Red Dome" mining claims quieted in them.
The major issue which is before the Court in this
matter is whether the documents filed with the Bureau of Land
Management (B.L.M.) were sufficient and acceptable to that
agency; and whether the Court finds the documents acceptable to
preserve plaintiffs rights against the defendants. The documents
are required to be filed under 43 U.S.C. section 1744. Under
this section claimants are required to file with the B.L.M.
before December 31st of each year a notice of intention to hold a
claim and an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim.
There is no issue as to whether plaintiffs filing with the B.L.M.
was timely.
The issue is whether the documents filed by
plaintiffs adequately complied with the statute in their form so
that they were sufficient and acceptable to the B.L.M.
If the

1

0Q125<*

documents
possession
defendants
acceptable
plaintiffs

were acceptable, plaintiffs are entitled to retain
of the claim, and may be entitled to damages from the
for trespass.
If plaintiff's documents were not
to the B.L.M., defendant's claims may be valid, and
may be liable to defendants for damages.
After consideration of the evidence presented at trial,
the Court finds that the documents supplied by the plaintiffs,
were sufficient and acceptable to the B.L.M., in both form and
content, and that their filing on the property remained valid.
There is substantial evidence that the documents were acceptable
to the B.L.M. 1. U.M.C. numbers were assigned to the claims. 2.
Before October 22nd, 1979 the filings were affirmatively
recognized by the B.L.M. through correspondence requesting more
information. Plaintiffs supplied the information. 3. The B.L.M.
has continued to receive and respond to further filings of proof
of labor. 4. The B.L.M. continues to maintain a file on the Red
Dome Mining claims.
5. In the past, the B.L.M. advised the
defendants that the filings made on behalf of Red Dome were
acceptable.
Had the documents supplied by plaintiff's been
insufficient, the B.L.M. would have requested that plaintiffs
supplement the information provided to the agency.
While the
B.L.M. does not have the authority to determine whether the
documents filed by plaintiffs were sufficient and acceptable
concerning the dispute between these parties, the agency has the
responsibility to determine sufficiency and acceptability of the
documents between the plaintiff and the B.L.M.
We do not disparage the right of BLM on its
own initiative to adjudicate any mining claim
in terms of compliance with section 314 of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. section 1744 (1982). Clearly
this is BLM's responsibility in administering
the statute.
We note, however, that upon
review of the sufficiency of the section 314
filings for a claim, no decision would
2
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ordinarily be issued approving the filings*
On Reconsideration, Sandra Memmott, 93 IBLA
115 footnote 2 (1986) .
There is no evidence before the Court that the B.L.M.
was not satisfied with the sufficiency and acceptability of
documents as they were presented by the plaintiffs. The Court
finds that the documents were also sufficient and acceptable to
accomplish the purposes of the statute. For the above reasons,
the Court finds that plaintiff's filings were acceptable to the
B.L.M. f and to this Court, and that the claims at all relevant
times remained valid. The claims were therefore not subject to
relocation by the defendants.
Defendants claim that the holding in United States et
al., v. Madison d. Locke, et al., 53 L.W. 4433 (1985), should be
controlling in this case. There the United States Supreme Court
held that the date for filing a notice of intention to hold a
claim required strict compliance. The Court finds that Locke, is
distinguishable because it is the sufficiency of the information
filed which is at issue in the case at bar rather than the time
it was filed. In Locke, the lawsuit was filed because the B.L.M.
indicated that the filing was late and was not in compliance with
the statute. The evidence presented to the Court indicates that
where the B.L.M. is not satisfied with the sufficiency of
documentation, the agency requests further information. Whether
a party is in compliance is left to the discretion of the B.L.M.
This is far different from non compliance with a strict time
limit set by Congress as was the case in Locke.
In the case at
bar, there is no evidence that the B.L.M. did not consider
plaintiffs to be in compliance with the statute. The Court is
satisfied that the summary submitted by the plaintiff's to the
B.L.M. satisfied the requirements of the statute, and that
supplying an actual copy of the sheets on file in the recorders
office was neither practical or necessary. The Court notes that

3
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in a strictly technical sense, the documents in the recorders
office are not actual notices of claim. If defendant's argument
was to be accepted, the only documents accepted by the B.L.M.
would be the original notices which were returned to the
claimants after copying into the county records.
A second issue is whether plaintiffs in any way
jeopardized their claim through failing to file proof of their
assessment work with the county. The evidence before the Court
is that the assessment work was done, but there was no filing
with the county.
Plaintiffs made the required filing with the
B.L.M.
The holding in Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 305 P.2d
503 (1957) is dispositive of this issue. In Knight, the Supreme
Court stated that: " . . . failure to file proofs of labor where
the work is actually done does not render claims subject to
relocation." The evidence in the case at bar indicates that the
work was done. The land was therefore not subject to relocation.
Because plaintiffs have a continuous valid claim on the
property, it was not subject to location by the defendants.
Defendants cross claim therefore is moot.
Because trial in this matter was bifurcated, the issue
of damages if any, has not been resolved. If the plaintiffs wish
to pursue damages, they must request a trial setting on that
issue in writing within ten days, or damages will be presumed
waived.
Counsel for plaintiffs to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a judgment, incorporating the terms of
this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as
to form prior to filing with the Court for signature.

4
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Dated this 23rd day of May, 1989.
BY THE COURT

cc:

Frederick A. Jackman, Esq.
Harold A. Hintze, Esq.
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orera, Utah 84058
(801) 225-1632

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME,
INC.,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs,
v.
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL,
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS,
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG
SANDERS,
Civil No. CV 7975
Defendants.

iJmvvULU fix a ^

tfaidvz^

This matter having come before the Court on the 22nd day of
May, 1989, on a bench trial, the Court having heard the proffered
evidence,

and having

reviewed

the

documents

stipulated

into

evidence, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That U.M.C. numbers were assigned to each of the claims

made by Red Dome.
2.

That before October 22, 1979, the filings by Red Dome

were affirmatively recognized by the Bureau of Land Management
(hereinafter

B.L.M.)

through

correspondence

requesting

more

0012oO

information.
3.

Red Dome, Inc., provided the information.

The

B.L.M.

has

continued

to

receive

and

respond

to

further filings of proof of labor.
4.

The B.L.M. continues to maintain a file on the Red Dome

mining claims.
5.

In the past, the B.L.M. advised the defendants that the

filings made on behalf

of Red Dome were acceptable.

documents

the

B.L.M.

supplied

would

by

have

plaintiffs

requested

that

been

Had

the

insufficient,

the

plaintiffs

supplement

the

information provided to the B.L.M.
6.

There is no evidence that the B.L.M. did not consider

the plaintiffs to be in compliance with the statute.
7.

The Court finds that the appropriate assessment work for

all years in question was done but there was no filing with the
County.
8»

The

Court

finds

that

the

plaintiffs

did

make

the

required filings with the B.L.M.
9.

The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters

its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
determine
sufficient

While

the

whether
and

the

B.L.M.

does

documents

acceptable

not
filed

concerning

2

have
by
the

the

the

authority

plaintiffs

dispute

between

to

were
the
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parties,

the

determine

B.L.M.

sufficiency

has
and

the

responsibility

acceptability

of

and

authority

to

the

documents

as

between the plaintiff Red Dome and the B.L.M.
2.

The summary submitted by the plaintiffs to the B.L.M.

satisfied the requirements of the statute and that supplying an
actual copy of the sheets on file in the recorder's office was
neither practical or necessary.
3.

The Court finds the documents supplied by the plaintiffs

were sufficient

and acceptable to the B.L.M.

in both form and

content and that the plaintiffs' filing on the property remain
valid and therefore the claims were not subject to relocation by
the defendants.
4.

Therefore, defendants' cross-claim is moot.

With regard to the failure to file the assessment claims

with the County, the Court finds that failure to file proofs of
labor where the work is actually done does not render the claims
subject to relocation.
DATED this

^? /

day of June, 1989.

3

Q012Gx

MAILING CERTIFICATE
c e r t i f y that on the
IfA
day of
, 1989, I mailed a true and correqt copy of the
UJUUpostage prepaid, to:
ing,

I
for

he reby

Harotd A. Hintze
Attorney for Defendants
3319 North University Avenue
#200
Provo, Utah
84604
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
(801) 225-1632
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME,
INC- ,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
v,
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL,
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS,
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG
SANDERS,
Civil No. CV 7975
Defendants.
The Court, having conducted a bench trial in this matter,
and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
now makes and enters the following:
JUDGMENT
1.

The plaintiffs are entitled to have title to the "Red

Dome" mining claims more particularly described in the exhibits
"A" -

lf lf

I

2.

attached to this Judgment quieted in them.
That defendants1 cross-claim is dismissed with

001*1D u

prejudice.
DATED this

^27

day of June, 1989.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
certify
that
on
the
IJ^/)
day
of
1989, I mailed a true and correjct copy of the
postage prepaid, to:
Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Defendants
3319 North University Avenue
#200
Provo, Utah
84604
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RED DOME //l PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 11 page 449 on September 5,
1946.

2)

Claim located September 5, 1946

3)

Legal Description
Lot 1; & beg. 10 chains West of the
of the Northeast 1/4 running thence
thence North 20 chains, thence East
South 20 chains to beg., all in Sec
South, Range 6 West, S.L.B. & M.

4)

Southeast corner
West 40 chains,
40 chains, thence
26, Township 21

Owners are
Red Dome, Inc
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 84631
Fillmore Products, Inc
Lessee
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 84631

W*l 58765

UMC

stiir
EXHIBIT "A'

REO DOME HZ PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 5<*3 on July 21, 1936.

2)

Claim located on July 21, 1936.

3)

An amendment recorded at Book 9 page 580 on April U, 1937.

<0

Legal Description
The East one-fifth (1/5) of Lot 1, all of Lot 2, and
all of Lot 3 in Section 23, Township 21 South, Range
6 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. Lot 2, Section 26
Tounship 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian,

5)

Ouners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 8^631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 6^631

l^—SSSESS—-""
M*1

U MC

5816S

^^
EXHIBIT "B"

RED DAME //3 PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD CUUNTY, UTAH
1) Notice of Loaction recorded at Book 9 page 5*»*» on July 21, 1936.
2)

Claim located on July 21, 1936.

3) An amendment recorded at Book 9 page 500 on April 6, 1937.
4)

Legal Description
The South three-fourths (3A) of the West four-fifths
V*/5) of Lot 1, in Section 23, Township 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, and all of
Lot k in Section 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 West,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian,

5) Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 8^631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
SR Box 125

Fillmore, LIT 8^631

VJ

^0

58770

EXHIBIT VC"

RED DOME //<• PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560 on October 26, 1936.

2)

Claim located on October 19, 1936.

3)

Legal Description
The North quarter of the West four-fifths (*»/5) of
Lot 1 and commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot
1 and running thence North 16 chains; thence East
18 chains; thence South 16 chains; snd thence West
18 chains; B 1 1 in Section 23, Township 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian.

*•) Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 8<*631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee

SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT

8*»631

\3

•0*r

58771

EXHIBIT »D"

RED DOME //5 PLACER MINING CLAIMS
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560

2)

Claim located on October 19 f 1936.

3)

Legal Description
*».5 Acres heing part of the Northeast 1 A of the South
east 1 A of Section 27, and also part of the tot 5t
Section 26 Tounship 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake
Base & Meridian and more particularly described as
fallows:
Commencing 3 chains UJest of the East 1 A corner of
Section 27, Tounship 21 South, Range 6 [Jest, Salt
Lake Base & Meridian, and running thence South 5
chains; thence East 9 chains; thence North 5 chains
thence West 9 chains to the point of beginning.

<») Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 0<»631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 6<*631

58772

xs?-

$ &

EXHIBIT "E"

RED DOME #6 PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD CUUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 10 page 2 6 5 on July 1 9 1938.

2)

Claim located on July 19 1938.

3)

Amendment recorded at Book 10 page 318 on June 2B9 1939*

*•)

Legal Description
The Northeast 1 A of the Southwest 1/U of Section 2 3 ,
Township 21 South 9 Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian.

5)

Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR 8ox 125
Fillmore, UT 8<i631
Fillmore ProductB, Inc
Lessee
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 8^631

U MC

EXHIBIT "F"

RED DOME ill PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 10 page 265 on July 1, 193B*
2)

Claim located on July 1, 1936.

3) Legal Description
Lot 1 and the North three-fourths (3/*0 of Lot 2f
Section 279 Tounship 21 South, Range 6 (Jest, Salt
Lake Base & Meridian,
U)

Ouners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 8^631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
SR Box 125
F i l l m o r e , UT 8<i631

U M C 58774

EXHIBIT "G"

RED DOME NEW DISCOVERY PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARO COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 12 page 339 on June 2 9 1950.

2)

Claim located on June 21, 1950.

3)

Legal Description
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 22 f
Toynship 21 South, Ranqe 6 Ulest, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian nnd running thence West flO rods; thence
North BO rods; thence East 00 rods; thence South
80 rods to the point of beg,

*•) Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT B«»631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT B<»631

<utt<L

59192

EXHIBIT

»H"
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RED DOME PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARO COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of location recorded at Book 9 page 3B4 on June 10, 1935.

2)

Claim located May ZU9 1935. (This claim uaa completely overlapped
by Red Dome //2 and //3.)

3)

Amendment recorded at Book 9 page 5**3 on July 20, 1936.

*•) Legal Description
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench mark M Y"
1931 to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No* 1; thence
Southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim
Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly thirty chaina to
Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 3; thence Northwesterly
twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. U;
thence Southwesterly thirty chaina to point of beginning. The above described Claim is located in and
is part of the South half of Section 23, and part of
the North half of Section 26, in Township 21 South
Range 6 West, S.L.B. & M.
5)

Owners
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT B4631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
m
Lessee
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 81*631

Wtyi<

[iNTLRlOn. BLM UW* **** u " ' c *
Data revive to this ^
^
I
H^i been entered into an automated

1J f|C58Rf67

1 Hmm heen microWmed.
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COUftTY U.E^I\
ft EX-OFHCIO CLfcftK OF THE
DISTRICT COURT

M"LLAI1D COUNTY
.
.vfV^

FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
(801) 225-1632
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME,
INC.,
AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
v.
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL,
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS,
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG
SANDERS,
Civil No. CV 7975 -

Defendants

-

Qtvip % f o ^ .

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION having come on regularly for trial
on May 22, 1989, before this court sitting without a jury with
Frederick A. Jackman appearing as attorney for plaintiffs, and
Harold

A. Hintze

appearing

as attorney

for defendants; the

respective parties hereto having introduced evidence both oral
and

documentary;

the Court having

heard

and considered the

evidence and arguments of counsel; and the Court having filed its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; now, therefore;
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Red Dome, Inc., is the owner in fee simple

«3e»k
Deputy

and entitled to the possession of certain Red Dome mining claims
situated in Millard County, State of Utah, described as follows:
1.

RED DOME BLANKET CLAIM
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench Mark
"Y" 1931 to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 1;
thence southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome
Placer Claim Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly
thirty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No.
3; t h e n c e Northwesterly twenty chains to
^e& XtoKve Placer cl^i.™ No. ^ 'ttraft^ &o>*ttaifestfexV;
thirty chains to point of beginning.
The above
described claim is located in and is part of the
South half of Section 23, and part of the North
half of Section 26, in Township 21 South, Range 6
West, S.L.B. & M.

2.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 1
Lot 1; and Beg. 10 chains West of the Southeast
corner of the Northeast 1/4 running thence West
40 chains; thence North 20 chains; thence East
40 chains; thence South 20 chains to beginning;
all in Sec. 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 West,
S.L.B.M. containing 120 acres.

3.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 2
The East one-fifth of Lot 1, containing 10.31
acres and all of Lot 2, containing 53.92 acres,
and all of Lot 3, containing 53.92 acres, all in
Section Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
all of Lot 2, containing 40.62 acres, in Section
Twenty-six (26) Township 21 South, Range 6 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

4.

RED DOME CLAIM NO.

3
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The South Three-fourths of the West Four-fifths
of Lot 1, containing 30.95 acres, in Section
Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and all of Lot
3, containing 40.95 acres, and all of Lot 4,
containing 48.02 acres, in Section Twenty-six
(26), Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
5.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 4
The North One-fourth of the West Fourth-fifth of
Lot 1, containing 10.30 acres and Commencing at
the NW corner of Lot 1, thence North 16 chains;
thence East 18 chains; thence South 16 chains;
thence West 18 chains to beginning, containing
28.8 acres, all in Section 23, Township 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
containing a total of 39.1 acres.

6.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 5
4.5 acres, being part of the NE1/4 of the SE1/4
of Section 27, and also part of the NW1/4 of the
SW1/4 of Section 26, Township 21 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; more
particularly described as follows:
Commencing 3 chains West of the East One-fourth
corner of Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more
particularly described as follows:

7.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 6
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3,
running thence East 20 chains; thence
Northwesterly 22 chains; thence in a southerly
direction 10.5 chains, more or less, to the place
of beginning; also the Northwest 1/4 of the
Southeast, and the Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest
1/4, all situated in Section 23, Township 21
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian.
3
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Amended Location Notice Recorded
page 318
Recorded June 28, 1939, 9:10 a.m.

In:

Book 10,

The Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section
23, Township 21 South of Range 6 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
8.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 7
Lot 1, containing 46.83 acres; the North 3/4 of
Lot 2, containing 35.14 acres; all situated in
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.

9.

RED DOME CLAIM NEW DISCOVERY
Commencing at the S.E. cor. of Sec. 22, Twp. 21
South, Range 6 West, S.L.B.&M. running thence
West 80 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East
80 rods; thence South 80 rods more or less to the
point of beginning. Containing 40 acres.

2.

The claims of defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott,

Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam
Sanders, and Craig Sanders and all who claim title under them in
and to said real property are without any right whatever, and
said defendants have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest
whatever in or to said mining claims or any part thereof;
3.

Defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell,

Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam Sanders, and
Craig

Sanders

permanently
lien,

or

and

al

enjoined

interest

persons
from

in

or

claiming

asserting
to

said
4

any
real

under

them

estate,
property

are

hereby

right, title,
or

any

part

ooi2v;,

thereof; and
4.

Plaintiffs shall recover from defendant Sandra Memmott,

Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett
Sanders, Pam Sanders, and Craig Sanders cost of court.
5.

The

defendants'

Counterclaim

is

dismissed

prejudice.

DATED this /^T

day/f f^C^K^K

, 1989,

0

with

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y that on the
LJ^L
day of
<[Uf\J
, 1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregbing/ postage prepaid, to:
Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Defendants
3319 North University Avenue
#200
Provo, Utah
84604

-(afaf.Um}
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rf^ftdc^L-—.. -.FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah
84058
(801) 225-1632
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY

GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
v.
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL,
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS,
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG
SANDERS,
Civil No. CV 7975
Judge Ray Harding

Defendants.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION having come on regularly for trial
on May

22, 1989, before

Frederick
Harold

A.

A.

respective
and

Jackman

this court

appearing

Hintze

appearing

parties

hereto

documentary;

the

as

as

having

Court

sitting without
attorney

attorney

for
for

introduced

having

heard

a jury

plaintiffs,

and

defendants;

the

evidence
and

with

both

considered

oral
the

evidence and arguments of counsel; and the Court having filed its
Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law;

and

the matter

having

come on before the Court for further proceedings on the 23rd day
of June, 1989, for purposes of considering attorney's fees and/or

00123.

contempt; now, therefore;
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS follows:
1..

Plaintiff, Red Dome, Inc., is the owner in fee simple

and entitled to the possession of certain Red Dome mining claims
situated in Millard County, State of Utah, described as follows:
1.

RED DOME BLANKET CLAIM
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench Mark
"Y" 1931 to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 1;
thence southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome
Placer Claim Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly
thirty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No.
3; thence Northwesterly twenty chains to Red Dome
Placer claim No. 4; Thence Southwesterly thirty
chains to point of beginning.
The above
described claim is located in and is part of the
South half of Section 23, and part of the North
half of Section 26, in Township 21 South, Range 6
West, S.L.B. & M.

2.

RED DOME CLAIM NO, 1
Lot 1; and Beg. 10 chains West of the Southeast
corner of the Northeast 1/4 running thence West
40 chains; thence North 20 chains; thence East
40 chains; thence South 20 chains to beginning;
all in Sec. 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 West,
S.L.B.M. containing 120 acres.

3.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 2
The East one-fifth of Lot 1, containing 10.31
acres and all of Lot 2, containing 53.92 acres,
and all of Lot 3, containing 53.92 acres, all in
Section Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and

2
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all of Lot 2, containing 40.62 acres, in Section
Twenty-six (26) Township 21 South, Range 6 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
RED DOME CLAIM NO, 3
The South Three-fourths of the West Four-fifths
of Lot 1, containing 30.95 acres, in Section
Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and all of Lot
3, containing 40.95 acres, and all of Lot 4,
containing 48.02 acres, in Section Twenty-six
(26), Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
RED DOME CLAIM NO. 4
The North One-fourth of the West Fourth-fifth of
Lot 1, containing 10.30 acres and Commencing at
the NW corner of Lot 1, thence North 16 chains;
thence East 18 chains; thence South 16 chains;
thence West 18 chains to beginning, containing
28.8 acres, all in Section 23, Township 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
containing a total of 39.1 acres.
RED DOME CLAIM NO. 5
4.5 acres, being part of the NE1/4 of the SE1/4
of Section 27, and also part of the NW1/4 of the
SW1/4 of Section 26, Township 21 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; more
particularly described as follows:
Commencing 3 chains West of the East One-fourth
corner of Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more
particularly described as follows:
RED DOME CLAIM NO. 6

Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3,
running thence East 20 chains; thence
3

on*'}*

Northwesterly 22 chains; thence in a southerly
direction 10.5 chains, more or less, to the place
of beginning; also the Northwest 1/4 of the
Southeast, and the Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest
1/4, all situated in Section 23, Township 21
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian.
Amended Location Notice Recorded
page 318
Recorded June 28, 1939, 9:10 a.m.

In:

Book 10,

The Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section
23, Township 21 South of Range 6 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
8.

RED DOME CLAIM NO. 7
Lot 1, containing 46.83 acres; the North 3/4 of
Lot 2, containing 35.14 acres; all situated in
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.

9*

RED DOME CLAIM NEW DISCOVERY
Commencing at the S.E. cor. of Sec. 22, Twp. 21
South, Range 6 West, S.L.B.&M. running thence
West 80 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East
80 rods; thence South 80 rods more or less to the
point of beginning. Containing 40 acres.

2.

The claims of defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott,

Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam
Sanders, and Craig Sanders and all who claim title under them in
and to said real property

are without any right whatever, and

said defendants have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest
whatever in or to said mining claims or any part thereof;
3.

Defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell,

Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam Sanders, and
4

00125.-

Craig

Sanders and al persons claiming under them

are hereby

permanently enjoined from asserting any estate, right, title,
lien, pr

interest

in or to said real property or any part

thereof; and
4.

Plaintiffs shall recover from defendant Sandra Memmott,

Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett
Sanders, Pam Sanders, and Craig Sanders cost of court•
5.

That any contempt proceedings for violation of a Court

order in another case would be more appropriately handled in that
case and before that Judge.
6.

That there is no statutory or contracted basis for

awarding attorney's fees to either party and therefore each party
shall bear their own fees and costs.
7.

The

defendants'

Counterclaim

is

dismissed

with

prejudice.
DATED this ^?^?,

day^f^ {^Z^^<As&

5

^

1989.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

/ \ I . hereby
certify
that
on t h e
_j^L_
day
jj^^C^ LjjCiyt^ r 1989, I mailed a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of
f o f e g o ^ g , postage prepaid, t o :
Harold A, Hintze
Attorney f o r Defendants
3319 North U n i v e r s i t y Avenue
#200

Provo, Utah

84604

'Mil Miffftf/m///,
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IN REPLY REFER TO:

United States Department of the Interior

•JSA>\

OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS
4015 WILSON BOULEVARD
ARL2NCTON. VIRCINIA

22203

CLEO MAY FRESH
MARJORIE P. DETERTS
IBLA 80-325

Decided

October 16, 1980

Appeal from the decision of the Colorado State Office, Bureau of
Land Management, returning various documents relating to mining claim,
CMC 150396, and declaring the claim abandoned.
Affirmed.
1.

Mining Claims: F.L.P.M.A.—Abandonment—Affi.invit of Assessment Work—Location Prior to October 21, 1976—Notice o£
Intention to Hold a Mining Claim—Recordation of Mining Claims;
LOCATION PROCEDURES—Relocation; REGULATIONS—ApplicabilityInterpretation.
Under sec. 314 of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, A3 U.S.C.
§ 1744 (1976), and 43 CFR 3833, the owner
of a mining claim located before Oct. 21,
1976, must file a copy of the official
record of the notice of location for the
claim and related documents with the proper
Bureau of Land Management Office on or
before Oct. 22, 1979. Failure to so file
is deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the claim by the owner.

APPEARANCES:

Carl H. Noel, Esq., Denver, Colorado, for appellants.
OPINION EY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE BURSKI

Cleo May Fresh and Marjorie P. Deterts have appealed from the
decision of the Colorado State Office, Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), dated December 7, 1979, returning various documents relating to
the Cleo May placer claim, CMC 150396, as insufficient for purposes of
recordation under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976).
TNDI-X CODE:
43 CFR 3833.0-5(1)
43 CFR 3833.1-2(q)
4 3 CFR 3833.2-1(a)
43 CFR 3833.5(f)
50 IBLA 363

CFS(Ml\<) 230(1980)

3

On September 27, 1979,
quitclaim deed dated May 2,
claim to appellants, a mapf
improvements for the period
1980. The affidavit, which
August 3, 1979, and the map
claim are one and the same*

appellants submitted to BLM a copy of a
1961, transferring the Behan placer mining
and an affidavit of value of labor and
from September 1, 1979, to September 1,
was recorded with the county recorder on
indicate that the Cleo May claim and Behan

In its decision, BLM indicated that appellants did not file a
certificate of location before October 22, 1979, as required by FLPMA
and enclosed a copy of the pertinent regulations. On January 11,
1980, counsel for appellants appeared at the BLM office and attempted
to submit* the original certificate of location for the Cleo May placer
claim* BLM would not accept it. A copy of the certificate of location attached to appellants' statement of reasons indicates that the
appellants located the Cleo May claim on April 18, 1949.
In their statement of reasons, appellants first point out that
the definition of ~[c]opy of the official record of the notice of certificate of location" found at A3 CFR 3833.0-5(1) includes: "other
evidence, acceptable to the proper BLM office, of such instrument of
recordation.'* Appellants argue that such evidence was offered and
accepted by ELM prior to October 22, 1979. Appellants" then contend
that they should have been allowed to correct filings as they
attempted to do, since they would have had ample time to submit the
required certificate of location if BLM had not accepted their filings
originally. They note that other claimants were informed that their
filings were deficient before the October 22, 1979, cutoff and argue
that they have been unfairly treated.
[1] Section 314(b) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1744(b) (1976),
requires the owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim
located prior to October 21, 1976, to file a copy of the official
record of the notice of locr.tion for the claim in the BLM office designated by the Secretary of the Interior within the 3-year period following October 21, 1976. Section 314 also provides that failure to
timely file such record shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the mining claim by the owner.
The corresponding re^u]atlou, 43 CFR 3833.1-2(a), reads as
follow!;:
(§] 3833.1-2

Manner of recordation—Federal Lands

(a) The owner of an unpatented mining claim, mill
site or tunnel site located on or before October 21, 1976,
on Federal lands, * * * .shall file (file shall mean being
received and date st.'impt'd by the proper BLM Office) on or
before October 22, 1979, in LIIU proper BLM Office, a copy
of the official record of the notice or certificate of
location of the claim or site filed under state law.

50 IELA 364

IBLA 80-325
Section 314(a) of FLPMA and Departmental regulations at 43 CFR
3833.2-l(a) also require the owner of such a mining claim to file evidence of annual assessment work performed during the preceding assessment year or a notice of intention to hold the mining claim on or
before October 22, 1979, or on or before December 30 of each calendar
year following the calendar year of recording.
Thus, on or before October 22, 1979, appellants were required to
have filed a copy of the certificate of location for the Cleo May
claim and evidence of assessment work for the .preceding assessment
year or a notice of intention to hold the claim.
The failure of BLM to notify appellants upon filing that their
submissions did not meet the requirements of FLPMA does not prevent
BLM from later doing so* 43 CFR 3833.5(f). Nor do noncomplying submissions become -acceptable" because BLM takes receipt of them. The
quitclaim deed submitted by appellants did not constitute "other evidence" of the certificate of location as it in no manner refers to the
location of the claim or the recording of that claim in the county
recorder's office. JL/ In any event, the provision of the regulations
concerning the submission of "other evidence" only applies when the
notice of location is no longer obtainable or when a claimant purports
to hold a claim under 30 U.S.C. § 38 (1976). Herein, appellants had a
copy of the location notice. They merely failed to send it to ELM.
Cf. Philip Saver, 42 IBLA 296 (1979).;l Additionally, we note that the
affidavit of assessment work was also unacceptable because it related
to the coming assessment year rather than the preceding year.
The responsibility for complying with the recordation requirements rested with appellants and appellants must bear the consequences
of their failure to do so. BLM has no authority to waive compliance
or accept late filings. Although it is undoubtedly true that BLM was
able to review and reject some noncomplying filings before the
October 22, 1979, filing date, there is no evidence that BLM did not
properly process appellants' filings. Glen J. McCrorey, 46 IBLA 355
(1980). »
As noted in the BLM decision, appellants may relocate these
claims for locatable minerals and file notice with BLM within 90 days
of location as provided in 43 CFR 3833.1 subject to any intervening
rights of third parties and assuming no intervening closure of the
land to mining location.

1/ It was unexplained and we find it curious that the quitclaim deed
purporting to transfer ownership of the claim at issue to appellants
has a later date than the certificate of location evidencing appellants1 location of the claim.
n) CFS(MIN) 69(1979)
b) CFS(MiN) 61(1980)
50 IBLA 365

<:i-\S(MIN) 2 50(1'J80)

IBLA 80-325
Therefore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of
Land Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, A3 CFR A.l, the
decision appealed from is affirmed.

WA++4*

XT /MUMA*.

J^mes L. Burskl
Administrative Judge

We concur:

iderick Fishman
Administrative Judge

Administrative Judge

50 IBLA 366
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IN REPLY REFER TO:

United States Department of the Interior
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS
4015 WILSON BOULEVAJU)
ARUNOTON, VIROINU 22203

JOHN J. VBCARCTK
GEOKGE W. VRABLE
IBIA 81-530

Decic3ed

October 21, 1981

Appeal from decision of the California State Office, Bureau
of Land Management, rejecting recordation of certain mining claims.
CA MC 54975 through CA MC 54978.
Affirmed as modified,
1.

Mining Claims: F.L.P.M.A.—Abandonment—Location Prior to
October 21, 1976—Recordation of Mining Claims; REGULATIONS—
Applicability.
Under sec. 314 of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, A3 U.S.C.
§ 1744 (1976), and 43 CFR 3833.1-2, the
owner of a mining claim located before
Oct. 21, 1976, must file a copy of the
official record of the notice of location
for the claim with the proper Bureau of
Land Management office on or before
Oct. 22, 1979. Failure to so file is
deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the claim by the owner.

2.

Mining Claims: F.L.P.M.A.—Recordation of Mining Claims;
REGULATIONS—Applicability; WORDS AND PHRASES—Copy of the
Official Record of the Notice or Certificate of Location.
"Copy of the official record of the
notice or cert iflcate of location11 means
a legible reproduction or duplicate,
except microfilm, of the original instrument of recordation of an unpatented mining claim which was or will be filed in
the local jurisdiction where the claim is
located or other evidence, acceptable to
the proper Bureau of Land Management
office, of such instrument or recordation.
It also includes an exact reproduction,
duplicate, or other acceptable evidence
except microfilm, of an amended instrument which may change or alter the
description of the claim. A quitclaim
deed is not an acceptable substitute in
the absence of a showing that the certificates of location were unavailable.

I.NDJ-M C0D1£
43 CFR 3833.0-5(i)
43 CFR 3833.1-2

58 IBLA 377

GFS(MIN) 370(19S1)
./-

IBIA 81-530
APPEARANCES:

Robert C

Coates, Esq., for appellants.

OPINICN BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE LEWIS
John J* VikarciJc and George W. Vtable have appealed from the
March 10, 1981, decision of the California State Office, Bureau of Lard
Management (BLM), rejecting recordation of certain mining claims held by
appellants including the Bedrock (CA HC 54975), Warlock (CA HC 54976),
Neptune (CA MC 54977), and Shamrock (CA MC 54978) mining claims* 1/
Appellants filed maps, quitclaim deeds, and proofs of labor for these
claims with BLM on October 20, 1979. No copies of the original location notices, however, were filed. Cn January 30, 1981, the California
State Office notified appellants that the claims could not be recorded
in the absence of original location notices,"and allowed appellants
30 days in which to submit the copies. 2/ Appellants neither sent
copies nor explained why copies were not available. On March 10, 1981,
BLM issued its decision rejecting the filings.
[1] Section 314(b) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA), 43 O.S.C. 5 1744(b) (1976), requires the owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976f to
file a copy of the official record of the notice of location for the
claim in the BLH office designated by the Secretary of the Interior
within the 3-year period following October 21, 1976. Section 314 also
provides that failure to file timely such record shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim by the
owner. William E. Talbott, 52 IBLA 12 (1981). a

[2] "Copy of the official record of the notice of location" is
defined by 43 CFR 3833.0-5(i) to include:
(A] legible reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm,
of the original instrument of recordation of an unpatented
mining claim, mill or tunnel site which was or will be
filed in the local jurisdiction where the claim or site is
located or other evidence acceptable to the proper BLM
office, of such instrument of recordation* It also includes
an exact reproduction, duplicate or other acceptable evidence, except microfilm, of an amended instrument which may
change or alter the description of the claim or site.
The purpose of the recordation requirements of FLPMA is to give notice
to BLM of the existence of mining claims on Federal lands so that this
information may be considered in the management of those lards. Tae

17 This appeal concerns only the four claims named above, although the
Hecision below also affected a number of other claims.
2/ See n.3, infra.

GFSOfTN) 27(1981)

IBLA 81-530
date of location is important for establishing the date from which a
claimant's rights to a particular claim arise. William E. T&lbott,
supra.
The quitclaim deeds submitted by appellants do not constitute
"other evidence" of the certificate of location under the above regulation as the deed in no-way refers to the location of the claim or its
recordation in the county recorder's office. Cleo May Fresh, 50 IBLA
363 (1980)? The provision in the regulation concerning the submission
of "other evidence" applies only when the notice of location is no
longer obtainable or when a claimant purports to hold a claim under
30 U.S.C. S 38 (1976). Jd. 3/ Although appellants were given 30 days
to submit copies of the original location notices, they did not submit
them and, further, gave no explanation as to why they did not. In
these circumstances, we cannot assutte that the notices of location are
no longer obtainable or that appellants purport to hold claims under
30 U.S.C. § 38 (1976) (entitled "Evidence of possession and vrork to
establish right to patent"). Accordingly, appellants' submission of
maps and quitclaim deeds was not sufficient to effect the recordation
of their claims. See Marvin E. Brown, supra at n.3.
Appellants do not allege compliance with the statutory and regulatory provisions. Instead, they argue that these requirements are
unconstitutional. They assert that unpatented mining claims are
valuable property rights requiring constitutional due process protection; that the Government may not alter prior vested rights by subsequent legislation; that there is no public welfare•interest nor an
emergency authorizing taking without just compensation; that the statutory irrebuttable presumption of abandonment is arbitrary and capricious; and that there has been no notice or opportunity to be heard
before forfeiture. In Lynn Keith, 53 IBLA 192, 197-98, 88 I.D. 369,
372 (1981)£we responded to similar objections to the constitutionality
of the statute as follows:
37 While quitclaim deeds may be acceptable if a claimant demonstrates
that the certificates of location are not available, the State Office's
letter of Jan. 30, 1981, purported to extend the time for filing the
documents which the statute required to be filed by Oct. 22, 1979. In
Lynn Keith, infra, we noted that Congress did not vest the Secretary of
trie Interior with the authority to waive or excuse noncompliance with
the statute. Although Organic Act Directive (QAD) 80-19 (Feb. 25, 1980)
refers to the submission of quitclaim deeds as a substitute for certificates of location, we do not read this as approving acceptability of
quitclaim deeds in all situations. See D. Estremado, 55 IBLA 49 n.l
(1981 )il The OAD 80-19 refers to OAD 79-7 (NDV. 24, 1978)# which indicated that quitclaim deeds may be accepted if the mining claimant
demonstrates that the certificates of location were unavailable. See
Marvin E. Brown, 52 IBLA 44 (1981 )• e
b)
c)
d)
e)

CFS(MIN)
GFS(MIN)
CFS(MIN)
GFS(MIN)

250(1980)
86(1981)
161(1981)
28(1981)

58 IBLA 379

GFS(MIX) 370(1981)

IBLA 81-530
Appellant's challenge of the statute and regulations
cannot be sustained here. Essentially, the regulations
merely mirror the statute and, to the extent that they have
been considered by the courts, they have been upheld. See
Tbpaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309
(D. Utah 1979) (appeal pending); Northwest Citizens for
Wilderness Mining Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management,
[Civ. No. 78-46 M. (D. tont. June 19, f979)T In any
event, i t has frequently been held that am appeals board of
t h i s Department has no authority to declare a duly promulgated regulation invalid. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 45 IBLA 313
(1980) ^ c f . Garland Coal and Mining Co., sTiBIA 60 (1981). S
Nsr may such a regulation be waiveci by the Department*
Marvin E. Brown, 52 IBLA 44 (1981), ard cases therein
c i t e d . With reference to the s t a t u t e , t h i s Board adheres
to i t s e a r l i e r holdings that the Department of the
Interior, being an agency of the executive branch of the
Government, i s not the proper forum to decide whether an
act of Congress i s constitutional. Alex Pinkham, 52 IBLA
149 (1981),iand cases therein c i t e d . Jurisdiction of such
an issue i s reserved exclusively to the judicial branch.
In answer to appellants' objection that there has been no opportunity
to be heard, we note that no hearing i s required in the absence of a
disputed issue of material fact. See United States v. Consolidated
Mines & ar«eltinq CO., Ltd,, 455 F."5T432, 453 (9th Cir. 1971). NcT
such issue arises as appellants do not dispute their failure to f i l e
the documents necessary to prevent their claims frcrn being deemed
abandoned under FLPMA.
We note that appellants may relocate these claims and f i l e notice
of this as provided in 43 CFR 3833.1, subject to any intervening rights
of third p a r t i e s , and assuming no intervening closure of the land to
mining location.
Therefore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of
Land Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 CFR 4.1 the decision
appealed from i s affirmed.

fafifa
Anne Foindexter

Lewis
Administrative Judge

fern2rd'v." P a ^ e ^
"
Suef Administrative Judge

"

rY

Douglas) E. Henriques
Administrative Judge

f)
8>
»0
i)

'aU±
53 IBLA 380

CFS(OCS)
CFS(MIN)
GFS(MTN)
GFS(MIN)

71(1980)
32(1981)
28(1981)
39(1981)
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IN REPLY KZJTR TO:

United States Department of the Interior

3833 (723)

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240
Organic Act D i r e c t i v e No. 79-7
November 24, 1978
To:

AFO's

From:

Associate Director

Subject:

Recordation Under Federal Land Policy and Management Act
Where Local Recordation Cannot be Established

There have already been instances where claimants, wishing to record
their mining claims with 3LM, have been unable to supply copies of
location notices, or certificates of location, which they believe to
have been recorded in the local recording office. Such cases normally
involve claims dating back to the turn of the century or before.
The Bureau recognizes that over the years many documents may become
lost or misplaced. A number of recording offices have been destroyed
by fire. Other types of casualties are known to have occurred.
The purpose of section 314 of FLPMA is to ensure that all mining
claims, mill sites, and tunnel sites are reflected in the land
records. Where a search of the local (county or recording district)
records, therefore, does not reveal the original filing, but does
show that there is reason to believe that a recording may have been
made, secondary evidence will be accepted. Evidence leading to a
belief that a recording may have been made includes, but is not
limited to, such things as a history of annual assessment work recordings, recorded grants to the present owner, or wills showing that
the claim was inherited by the present owner or a predecessor in
interest. The above items are described in 43 CT& 3362.1-4. In
43 CFR 3862.3-1 the means of establishing a right by occupancy is
described. Where the above described documents cannot be produced,
a right by occupancy will be accepted.
We expect that if this situation is to become acute, it will happen
during the last two or three months before October 22, 1979. In each
case, the material will be accepted, along with the filing fee, and
date stamped. Subsequent review of the material will determine
whether or not it is sufficient. Any case where a decision cannot, be
made as to its sufficiency will be referred to the Director (720) for
a final decision.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FVH

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Attorney for Plaintiff
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NOTICE OP LOCATION
OP
CINDER CRATER NO, EIGHT PLACER MINING CLAIM

,
J
'!

f
*

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that Merrill G. Memmott and Marie S # Memmott, of •
•
t

| Salt Lake City, Utah, and Ralph C. Memmott and Grace K. Memmott, of Sclpio, Utah, all citizens j,
'' of the United States, having complied v/ith all of the requirements of law and the local rules
, and customs, claim by right of discovery and location a valuable bed or deposit of volcanic

!»

I

jj cinders or ash and other minerals, which placer mining ground or claim the undersigned have
'
i!
J, name the "CINDER CRATER NO. EIGHT." Said claim contains 46.73 acres, is situated in unorganized

i'
J mining district, Millard County, State of Utah, and is described as follows:
I
Lot Five of Section 26, Township 21 South,
|
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian.

t

This claim lies about 4 miles North of White Mountain and about 10 miles West of
Fillmore, Utah.
^he undersigned have erected at the point of discovery a monument about three feet!*
.1
high above the ground situated about 50 feet South and 985 feet West from the North East corner
«
»•
•i

of this claim upon which monument this notice la conspicuously posted.
The undersigned have distinctly marked each corner of this claim by erecting

»
kt

each corner a monument about three foet high above the ground so that the boundaries thereof

--4

'

-name the

w-.^*o, .aixui uxtxovr irunmg ground or claim the undersigned have

U

CINDSB CRATER NO. EIGHT/1

Said claii

ntains 46.73 acres, is situated in unorganized

mining district, Millard County, State of Utah, and is described as follows:
Lot Five of Section 26, Tov/nship 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian.
This claim lies about 4 miles North of White Mountain and about 10 miles West of
Fillmor*, Utah.
T

he undersigned have erected at the point of discovery a monument about three feet

high above the ground situated about 50 feet South and 985 feet West from the North East corner
of this claim upon which monument this notice is conspicuously posted*
The undersigned have distinctly marked each corner of this claim by erecting

&t

each corner a monument about three feet high above the ground so that the boundaries thereof
can be readily traced.
Date of Location:

March 5th, 1947.
MERRILL G. MEMMOTT

Witnesses to posting of notice and marking of boundaries:

MARIE S. MEMMOTT

Merrill G# Memmott

RALPH C. MEMMOTT

Ralph Memmott.

GRACE K. MEMMOTT
Locators

By:
Piled for record March 10, 1947 at 9:00 A. M. P i l e No.#60157
Camilla Hunter. County Recorder.

Edward B. Jones, Agent.
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1T0TICE OF LOCATIOl
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned having complied with the require-

//

s A

ments of Section 2524 of the Revised "Statutes of the United States and the Local
Laws, Customs and Regulations of this District, has located fifteen hundred feet in

'^

v

length by Six Hundred feet in width, on this, the Elwood No, 1. Lode, Vein or Deposit,
bearing gold, silver, copper, lead and other valuable minerals, situate in Tintic
Mining District Juab County, State of Utah, the location being described and marked on the
ground as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at this discovery and running about S. 6° W. 1000 feet, and about N. 28°
E. 500 feet, and claiming all ground within 300 feet on each side of this the lode
line, excepting conflicts with Sur, Nos. 2945, 3295, 4014, 2955, 5393 and 6015.
The £ Cor. between Sees. 25 and 36, T. 10 S. , B 2 W. bears about N. 89° 30' E. 312 feet.
The above described Mining Claim shall be known as the Elwood No. 1.
Located this 1st day of July. 1930.
NAMES OF LOCATORS:
Yfitness
Jos N. Elsinor

Jesse Haws

Filed for Record July 1, 1930 at 2:55 P. M. H. M. Nay lor, Recorder A. Naylor Deputy
Recorded Book 14 page 273.
No. 45745 Recorded at the request of Jesse Haws, July 3, 1930, at 10 A. M.

C o un-ty-fti2#r6 r d e r

WOTTOF. OF LOCATION

\>' •

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

Filed b>.

The Anaconda ComDany
555 17th Street
Denver, CO 80217

For ana on behalf of the owners:

Owner(s):
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ROCKY FORD PLACER CLAIM N o . 2 .

•ql3 MB 20 $ «Q ;57

urn or r-nj-^E
uu

NOTICE OF LOCATION OF PLACER CLAIM.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned citizens of the United States over the age
of Bl years .have this day located under and in pursuance of and having complied with Sections
2329,2330,2331 of the revised Statutes of the United States, and the laws of the State of
Utah and the local laws and customs and regulations of this District .have this day located
the following described Placer Mining Ground,situated in the Unorganized Mining District, of
Juab County,State of Utah,viz:
E£ Lots 4 and 5 North 344 feet of Lot 12; South .976 ft.of the West & of Lot 5 all in
Section 4.T.15S.R.3 V/.S.L.B.& M. Containing 60 acres.
This claim is'located upon a valuable vein or deposit.bearing gold.limestone, and other
precious metals, situated in Juab County.Utah.
This claim shall be known as the Rockv Ford Placer No.2 Placer Mining Claim, and we in-r O*
tend to work the same in accordance with the local customs and rules of miners in said mining "';
district, and each of the undersigned have an undivided 1/3 interest therein.

{

Located this 2nd day of June 1926.
NAMES OF LOCATORS
Geo.u.Chaffin^>
Horace Burkinshaw
D.V/. Jennings.
No.37489 Recorded a t t h e r e q u e s t of Horace B u r k i n s h a w . J u n e 23,1926 a t 1 1 : 3 0 A.M.

;—
v±*• '

_^&-#<m*L~
CoC ;v~ -"..reorder.
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NOTICE

I S K E R J S E n r G I V E N , That t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , having complied

with the r e q u i r e m e n t s of SECTION 2 3 2 4 of t h e REVISED STATUTES of t h o
United S t a t e s , a n d t h e Local Laws, C u s t o m s and Regulations of this District,
ha

located Fifteen h u n d r e d f e e t in length by 6 0 0 f e e t in width, on this
ftiiM

bearing
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Gold , Silver, Co PP<^r, Lead and
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Mining" District,
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.County, State of.

the location being d e s c r i b e d and marked on t h e ground as f o l l o w s , t o - w i t :
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(Discovery)
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T h e a b o v e d e s c r i b e d Mining Claim shall be k n o w n a s t h e

Located t h i s .

T

/

.day of.

t BUCUM of

Note.
•The small t r p * on blank BnM Is mareJy *
raid* for th# locator and i» BO p * r t of Jsi»
notice
tDlAOU.lt: or Cuutt—Tba location (diaeorary
poirt) and corner monument* thou Id b« designated on the accompanying diagram to make
the Record of claim a o r * perfect.
A mining elalm most not exe*«d 1500 feet in
lenjrth along th» vtin or lode, by 600 feet in
width. 300 feet on each sida of cantor of vein
at surface.
No location of a mining elalm can ba mads
until the discovery of tbe vein or lode within
the limits of tbe ground c l a l a e d .
Tbe claim mutt ba distinctly marVed on the
ground, so i u boundaries c a s be readily traced.
A eevere penalty Is provided by law for rem o \ n j or defacing the s U a e s or monuments of
a min ng c aim.
Claims located on Sunday or holidays art
legal.
All valuable mineral deposits In lands of the
Government mn locatable by eiUx#->« of the
Uni'ed S'atea only, and t h m e who have dec ared their intentions to become tuna.
Tbie location notice n i . i t be filed for R « o r d
•»ith the County Peeor<*»r of tba county in
which the cairn is located.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, That the undersigned, having complied
quirements of Section 2324 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and the I oca!
Laws, Customs and Regulations of this District, ha..^5... located fifteen hundred feel ir.
length by ...LP.AA
hundred feet in width, on this, the ....^fc:?u.. .j.r . J<..ui.\
Lode, Vein or Deposit, bearing Gold, Silver and other precious metals, situated ip
...U^J&Mtetlh.... Mining District,
..JpAAzk.
County,
yl"(.f. {^
the location being described and markdc/on the ground as follows, to wit:
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The Mjjiina Claim above described shall be known as the
£jt^.-ZZi...Ifa&sA.
£%^k±.l^r.„^S>Jr^
Located this.. ^..^^<^A
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NAMES OF LOCATORS
'IAJL

^

^Ls^c^

19../^

-fm^^.-»—i2lbr^i?.L
CE2ZTD SLCl-Z.Z.W&.klJl.Z^*

V;^T'"ZZZ^"±''^^j„^j
f?L!a!

J.L'.;.

~

BOfl 12? nz3 *A

J..1

CfOJK.JwU^Mr Recorder

(*Refer to Stakes or Monuments or Exterior lines and Discovery in this description
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IN REPLY REFER TO:

United States Department of the Interior
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS
4015 WILSON BOUUVAXD
ARLINGTON, VDUnNJA

22203

ELLIS BUSffiMAN
IBIA 84-332

Decided June 26, 1985

Appeal frcra a decision of the Oregon State Office, Bureau of Land Management, declaring the Lost Nugget mining claim abandoned and void.
Affirmed.
1.

Federal Land Policy and Management Act cf 1976:
Recordation of Mining Claims and Abandonment—Mining
Claims: Recordation
BLM may properly declare an unpatented mining claim
abandoned and void for failure to file timely with BLM
a ccpy of the notice cf location c£ the claim, pursuant
to sec* 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act cf 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982)..

APPEARANCES: Ellis Buschman, pro se.
CPINICN BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE GRANT
Ellis Buschman has appealed from a decision of the Oregon State Office,
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), dated Jaruary 20, 1984, declaring the lost
Nugget mining claim abandoned and void for failure to file timely with BLM a
ccpy of the notice cf location of the claim, pursuant to section 314(b) of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. S 1744(b)

(1982).

y

On May 13, 1983, appellant filed a ccpy of his affidavit cf assessment
work done between December 1, 1982, and March 1 1 , 1983, on the Lost Nugget
claim with BLM pursuant to section 314(a) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. S 1744(a)
(1982). The affidavit had been filed with the Douglas County recorder on
\/ Consideration cf t h i s appeal was s t ^ e d pending judicial review of the
mining claim recordation provisions of FLPMA. The constitutionality cf these
previsions was recently upheld by the Supreme Court. United States v. Locke,
105 S. Ct. 1785 (1985). a
INDEX CODE:
43 CFR 3833.1-2(a)
43 CFR 3833.4(a)
a) GFS(MIN) JD-1(1985)

87 IBLA 345

GFS(MIN) 103(1985)

IBLA 84-332
May 9, 1983, but did not indicate when the claim had been located. By letter
dated June 28, 1983, BLM requested appellant to indicate the appropriate BLM
serial number associated with the claim, in order to ensure proper filing of
the affidavit. 2/ On July 11, 1983, appellant responded that he "do[es] not
have a number fran B.L.M."
In i t s Jaruary 1984 decision, BLM declared appellant's mining claim
abandoned and void because i t had not been "recorded" with BLM, and rejected
appellant 1 s 1983 affidavit of assessment work filed for recordation. On
appeal, appellant contends that he has a "right" to the claim because i t i s
recorded with the county.
[1] Section 314(b) of FLPMA requires the owner cf an unpatented
mining claim to f i l e with BLM a copy of the notice of location of the claim
within the 3-year period following October 21, 1976 (claims located prior to
October 21, 1976), or within 90 days after the date of location of the claim
(claims located after October 21, 1976). The record does not indicate when
appellant's claim was located. It seems clear that the claim was located on
or before December 1, 1982, the date on which appellant began assessment
work. Hcwever, the record does not contain a copy of appellant's notice of
location. Appellant has simply not conplied with section 314(b) of FLPMA. 3/
Under section 314(c) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. S 1744(c) (1982), failure to
f i l e the required instrument in accordance with the statute "shall be deemed
conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim * * * by the
owner." In such circumstances, the claim "shall be void." 43 CFR 3833.4(a).
We have long held that the statute i s self-operative and that Congress did
not invest the Secretary of the Interior with authority to waive or excuse
noncompliance with the statute, or to afford claimants any relieftfrcm the
statutory consequences. Homestake Mining Co., 77 IBLA 235 (1983), and cases
cited therein.
Accordingly, we conclude BLM prcperly declared appellant's mining
claim abandoned and void.. Harold A. Hinkle, 77 IBIA 152 (1983)?°William E.
Day, 72 IBIA 364 (1983). d
2/

BLM also stated that:
"If you do not have a BIM 'OR MC1 number, and have not recorded your
claim with this office within the specified time periods prescribed, the
claims are considered abandoned and \roid (reference enclosed Circular
No. 2516A, 43 CFR 3833.4).
"Abandoned claims may be relocated under applicable mining regulations
subject to existing rights and provided the lands are open to mining. The
instruments for your new claim should be recorded under state law and then
must be filed with BLM within 90 days after the date of location of the new
claim under the requirements of 43 CFR 3833.1-2(a)."
3/ Indeed, in his July 1983 letter to BLM appellant essentially admitted
that a copy of the location notice for his claim had not been filed with BLM.
b) GFS(MIN) 18(1984)
c) GFS(MIN) 10(1984)
d) GFS(MIN) 109(1983)

87 IBLA 346

IBIA 84-332
There fore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of Land
Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 CFR 4 . 1 , the decision appealed
from i s affirmed.

Administrative Judge
We concur:

Whu Philip Borton
Chief Administrative Judge

Administratis

87 IBLA 347

GFS(MIN) 103(1985)
/?/?
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Stato.'of Utah, iand; the!localV;laYis;.and customs and r e g u l a t l c
Ground,"situated i n t h o
day . l o c a t e d tho r f o i l o v i i n g ' d e s o r l b e d . P l a c e r Mining Grc
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Survey Bench'Mark "Y!1 1931' t o Bod Dome p l a o o r Claim S t a t e Ho, 1 ; t h c n c o S o u t h e a s t e r l y
tv/enty chains t o Bod Dome P l a c e r Claim s t a k e Ho. 2 ; thcnco H o r t h o a s t o r l y t h i r t y
1
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Located t h i s ! l B t h ' d a y or J u l y , . 1 9 3 6 .
MIMES OF L0CA.T0B3
t l e c o r d e d - J u l y - 2 0 , ' 1 9 3 6 | a t ^ 9 : 1 5 11. M.

L a f a y o t t o l.'prrlcon

Amoliu Black) CountyNpeoorder

Fera L I t t i o
Armond Ogdon

— *>* "inc,\Tion OF PLACEB CLAIM

,

o
O

c:>
o

., '" ' ••*• • - ' .-, ,'' ; "* - * -1— : * N O T I C E ' O F L O C A T I O N
, "; • • ' M>: .'•i,,,!:»'70P I'LACEI! C L A I M
TO vaiow IT M M COKGETOIr \ J ^ l ^ ^ tfj. V "V!
• • ill' . •• i • u.?> r i > A • . i' v i
L .
N O T I C E IS'KENEDY 01VEN that*, the! underslgnod'.cl tlzons o f the U n i t e d Statoa, o v o r tho a g o
or 2 1 y e a r s , have, this'day located, undorf'ai d* In p u r s u a n c e 'of a n d h a v i n g compiled w i t h Soctlor
2 3 2 9 , 2 3 3 0 , 2 3 3 1 , o f ' tho H e v l s e d Statutes of'tho U n i t e d S t a t o s , a n d tho lawo o f tho State -6f
U t a h and the l o c a l . l a w s a n d - c u s t o m s .Jand ^regulations of' this d i s t r i c t , h a v e this d a y l o c a t e d
•»• i

the following d e s c r i b e d Placor 'Mining! G r o u n d , * s i t u a t e d In' tho !un-najnod M i n i n g D i s t r i c t Mlllord.
•'I.:
C o u n t y , Stato o T U t a h , viz*
Lot 1 ; and D c g ^ l O chains West o f tho South E a s t cornor of tho* North• East- 1/4 running,
thence West 40 c h a i n s , thenco North 20 c h a i n s , thenco
Eaot 40 c h a i n s Jr thenco South 2 0 ' c h a i n s ' t o b e g i n n i n g , a l l In Soc • 2 6 ,
Township'21 South, Nange 6 Yiost, S.L.13.M, c o n t a i n i n g 120 a c r o a .
This claim c o n t a i n s v:a l u a b l e v o l c a n i c c l n d o r s and othor v a l u a b l o
mineral-to wit:-.?; v • • , * >
•

•:

•.;.,.., ...i^.vr-

•

•

This claim la l o c a t e d u p o n a'.valuable deposit, b e a r i n g g o l d a n d . o t h e r p r e c i o u s m o t a l a ,
situated In Ml liar d County,, Utah1|.V.s.!i • •••! •-,*.' . .'•'.• ..
Thla c l a i m shall b o k n o w n as 4 , the Red; D o m e Wo.lt P l a c e r M i n i n g Claim, and n e I n t e n d to
• I ••
• : «,*; t-;,*t-.\..:,.-l ..V•• •
"
: *
w o r k tho samo In accordance ".with'.local* cuatoma and ruloo. o f m i n o r a I n s a i d m i n i n g d i s t r i c t ,
v •, f •*.[ ;.1 j jj'm. at »M* .
-•.!••.
and each of the undersigned have1anundlvldcd ono'olxth
: Interest thoroln.

.•,.-. , • , .-•. • \ *'.\w ' '

Located this 5th, day .of September, • 1946.
. •• .l,};,'.NAMES* OF" LOCATONQ
II. Si 'Morrison-'/
LaVonne'.Morrison

llecordod September 5 , 194G* at r *3!00'P .M. F l l o //G0586

Lafayotto Morrison
Cora S, Morrison
Ralph Vf. Morrison
Calllo C. Morrison
Delta-Utah,

- ' ^ ^ ^ M

, . ; : ; : NOTICE H.OF # LOCATION ',, OF

PLACER . CLAIM .;• *•;

TO YIHOM I T MAY. CONCERN
NOTICE IS'UEIIEDY GlVHHithat t h o ; u n d e r s i g n e d o i t l z e n s f i f
;;

. ..-,....

••:• = •••

j-?. i •,»!».-.-.I... • ! . - .

.. .

• ? : ".V . * , . ;;*»:

\

l

t h e United S t a t o s , over t h e
• i

ago of 21 years, 1 have this' day; located under and in pursuanco of and having, complied with
Sections 2329, 2*630, 2331 of the ltevisod Statutes of .the United States, and the lavia of tho
State or Utah and the local laws and customs and regulations of this d l s t r i o t , huve t h i s
day located the following described Placer Mining Ground,situated in tho

_

Mining District, Millard County ,*State of Utah , v i z : #.
*
!
1
The East ono fifth of Lot 1 9 ;containing 10.31 acres and All or Lot 2, containing
53,92 acres and All*or Lot 3, containing 53,92 acres, a l l in Section Twenty-throe
123), Township 21.South,.Hang o 6 \lest> Salt Lako Base and Merldlun, and
All or Lot 2, contalning'40.62 acrc3 and All or Lot 3,* containing 40.95 acres, in
Soctlon .tvienty-six-(20) ,:':Township 21 South, Range 0 Yloot, Salt Lako Baso and

; Meridian,;-, .v:.^:;;r;^vl:.:^:^.;VKfrV—5 !-'l-; • ;'••'••!:••• •: : '

This claim is located'.upon a'valuablo deposit, bearing £pld and other precious metals
. .

'

• » * • • . ' •
'

:

• • • ' • '
«

,

•

i - . • • • • : • • • • " «
•

'

•

• • • .
'

. » "

situated in Millard County J.Utah.

' , • . ' . •
•

v

'

i

t

. • , ;
-

.

:

. »
.

;

i
•

•

•
•

• '

v .'.• .' ;• ••'•'•
. j . • • •>

•

•
• • •

•
.

•

'

;

.

'

'
'

•

« .•
. ,.; *

t
•

*

•

•

T h i s c l a i m s h a l l b o k n o w n ' a s ; the* Rod Dome placor Claim No* 2,-Placer Mining Claim, and
wo Intend to work the same in accordance viith* local customs and rules or minors in said

mining d i s t r i c t , and'each o f { t h e undersigned have'an unalvided o n e - t e n t h i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n .
Located t h i s 2 1 s t ' d a y of, J u l y y ' 1 9 3 6 ,
WlMES OF LOCVfORS

hecovded J u l y 2 1 , 1936 a t . l i : o u * . M.
Ajnclie Black, County Recorder

Cora S . Morrison

L a f a y e t t e Morrison

Arinond Ogden

Hlchard S . Morrleou

D e l i l a h U* O&dcn

La Yonne H o r r l t o n

Fera L i t t l e

Duvld 11. Dybee

Verda L i t t l e

Verda Byboe

llOTICK:.OFi,..LOOATI01l;l!J.?;--:"'
" OF
"~ '"PLACER.CLAIM . ;
J HOTICEiOFiLOCATIOH;.
Jf ^ ./|.
TO WHOM I T MAY CONCERN

"

Mining d i s t r i c t ;

Itie *>outh 'Hirco Fourths of the'Yieot F o u r - f l f t h a of Lot 1 , c o n t a i n i n g 3 0 . 9 5 a c r e a f
In S o c t l o n 2 3 , Township 21 S o u t h / Rango 6 VJeat, S a l t Lako DQSO and Meridian, and
I
A l l of Lot 4, c o n t a i n i n g 4 8 . 0 2 a c r e s , l n : S e c t l o n 2 0 , Township 21 ^outh, Ilan^o 0
J
V?e3t, S a l t Lake Base and. Meridian/. * • .
This claim I s l o c a t e d ' u p o n a , v a l u a b l e d e p o s l t , : bearing gpld and o t h e r p r e c i o u s m e t a l s
s i t u a t e d i n Millard County . .Utahjr jy••:^^V^^•;l!^•^/;:••^;^;;:.•.|:>'' " '--^ •
.•-V"
• • i v : ^ ^ ! ; i i ^ n f v l ^ •.-•;:••:•,.
••
• • • : •
This c l a i m s h a l l be knovm.as ;the.| Red* Dome P l a c e r Claim Mo. 3 . P l a c e r Mining Claim, and vo
intend to vrork tho: sairo. In'. accordeitce .with' loca 1 cu 3 to no and r u l o a of minora .In s a i d mining

]

d i s t r i c t , and eacli of tho under signed j h a v e ' e n ; undivided o n e - f o u r t h I n t e r e s t t l o r e l n *

:

Located t h i s 21ot day of .July ,v .1936 *i* ^-* ^ : * ^-i *' •!-:*

^';. /•

*

, 1; NA!v!ES; 0F ; L0GA0TRS .-/
Ralph V/# Morrison

Recorded J u l y 2 1 , 1936 at* 1 1 : 3 0 A.;M. .

C a l l l o C. Morrison
Amelia Dlack, County Recorder f'
Ben B. H a l l
Y/lnlfred S . Hall

• MnrnTHT?

r-~._T.OCAY.lOH

f

l!OTICECoFli% LOCATE

;1:r OF* PLACEH ClAIM \\\

'•'*'.

TO V.110W IT l'u\Y C0NCEIU4:
NOTICE I S HEREBY. CIV EH.that § the-undorsl^ncdl c i t i z e n s : o f i t b e . United S t a t e s , over the
age of 21 ye a r s , have t h i s .day(located^undor^andvlnipursuance'of'.and having* complied viith
r -

;

' -

\ * k * : I ^ V * ^ ^

"• . • • • - • • • • • •

-- .

S e c t i o n s 2329 , 2630, 2331 of t h e - R e v i s e d S t a t u t e s ' o f t h e ' U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h e ' l a v i s of the
S t a t e of Utah and the local!;lavi3' and1 customs land ! r e g u l a t i o n s ,of . t h i s d i s t r i c t , have t h i s day
l o c a t e d the f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d P l a c e r Mining Ground, s i t u a t e d i n ' t h e

'

Mining

:

D i s t r i c t , Millard County , S t a t e ' o f : Utah, ^yi^:.-j^ j : f •:; \',v .:•*••. ,
: .. .'•?.. •.
TV.e North o n e - f o u r t h o f ' the Vloati-four-fl f ths o f Lot l' f c o n t a i n i n g 1 0 . 3 0 a c r e s and
Commencing:, a t the MYI corner or'*Lot 1 , thence Uorth 10 c h a i n s ; thence East ,113
c h a i n s ; thence South'1G 1 c h o i n o ; . thonco Most 10 c h a i n s t o b e g i n n i n g , c o n t a i n i n g
213.8 a c r e s , o i l * i n S e c t i o n * 2 3 , Tovmship 2 1 U o u t h , Rang* 0 West, S a l t Lake Dnuo
and Meridian, c o r i t a i n i n g o / t o t o l : of 3 9 ? 1 a c r e s . ,:•
f
a. v a l u a b l e d e p o s i t f l .buaring (;old and o t h e r p r e c i o u s m e t a l s
This c l a i m i s l o c a t eed;upon
d

3 i t u u t c d in r . i l l a r d Coun t y ^ u t a h / ! ; l ; - j ^ ^

;,. :•:;*>.;•'';<>'-: ... { .

This c l a i m s h a l l bo knoviii as* t h e i«od Dome, P l a c e r Claim Ho. 4 P l a c e r Mining Claim, and
vie intend to work the sane i n accordance n i t h ; l o c a l customs and r u l e s of miners i n s a i d mining,
d i s t r i c t , and each o f t h e undersigned hovo*an undivided o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t
Located t h i s 19th day of October ' 1 9 3 6 . '

therein.

j

I'.NM&S'pF LOC/tTOIlS
Recorded October 2 0 , 193 G at 4:50 p . w.
,»iin i n « r v

r.onntv hocordor

Von U t l e y
Zola* IItiny

i:'l;JMOTXCIS •' OF .ILOCATIOtl >

P. 5 00

. ^ : - ! : | . : y . . ' | V ^ . : . V : ; - , , i - ^ . ,«.-•;;

OF;PL/WCKR cLAir/:^!.;
TO V;I;OJ.: I T >'AY CONCERN?

HOTICE 13 HERISHY GIVEN'that the vundorsigned - c i t i z e n s of lithe', United S t a t e s / ovor t h e age
J
of 21 yuara, have th i s duy l o c a t e d ' under !aiid<iin*Spursuaneo -of and having complied with S e c t i o n s j

2329, 2330, 2331 of'.' t h e Revised, 3tatuto3|:of |:the,Unltedj S t a t e s , ; ; and the :laws of the S t a t o of.

{

rs aiid : , c:istoma-and-re^ulatioiio'vof: t h i s ; d i s t r i c t , : have t h i s day l o c a t e d
Utuh and the l o c a l 1 avis

I

the f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d Placer;MiniiiG<OroundVvsi.tuutod i n i t h o , ' '

v

Mining D i s t r i c t ,

lilllard

County, Stato of Utah, v i z ; ; \ . c o n t a i n i n g
4 . 0 Acres', b e i n g p a r f ' o f : t h e i HE£'*of the SE£ o f S e c t i o n 2 7 , a n d a l s o part of
the W\/£ of the • SW-J o f S o c t i o n 2 0 , Township 21 South, Hange G West, S a l t Lake
base and !.:eridifin, m o r e - p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d 1 as f o l l o w s •• •
Coininencln,- 3 .'chain;; vv/oi:t of the*
East one Fourth* corner of S e c t i o n 2 7 ,
Twp. 21 South , llango p \ i e s t , ; and'riuuiln^'thonce'South *o c h a i n s ; thence Enst
M c h a i n s ; thence l:ortii. l>: chains;': thence V/est 9 c h a i n s to the p o i n t of
beginning.
This claim i s l o c a t e d upon«a r ; valuablejdoposi t f : ' b e a r i n g gold and o t h e r procio us motnls
s i t u a t e d i n Millard County,}.Utah;
This .o.la lm a h u l l bo known a s <the ;lled;Doine ; Plaoor Claim.No. 15,' P l a c e r Mining Claim, and
we intend to Viork'tho .sa^lo^ln ! accorcIancQ^\/lth!;local , customs! and r u l e s of miners i n s a i d miningdistrict,

and each of ;the: undorsigncd,have a n : : u n d i v i d e d . o n e - h a l f

interest therein.

Located t h i a 19th day.Vor(0ctobor,.ia930; ; ;

. .'
'

IllA^S {OF LOCATORS I:1
Recorded October 20- 193u';r. t|;:4:150 iF.!M,

Von U t l c y

Amelia Dlack, County Recorder/'

ZOLA UTLKY

Tab 17

R£D DOME PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1) Notice of location recorded at Book 9 page 38k on June 10, '1935.
2) Claim located May 2U, 1935. (This claim yas completely overlapped
by Red Dame ifl and #3.)
3) Amenoment recorded at Book 9 page 5^3 on July 20, 1936.
*0

Legal Description
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench mark MYrt
1931 to Re^ Oome Placer Claim Stake No. 1; thence
Southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim
Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly thirty chains to
Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 3; thence Northwesterly
twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. k;
thence Southwesterly thirty chains to point of beginning. The above described Claim is located in and
is part of the South half of Section 23, and part of
the North half of Section 2S, in Township 21 South
Range 6 iiiest, S.L.3. I M.

5) Owners
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 8^531
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
in^s
n(uA
SR Box 125
'is *i n
Fillmore, UT fi<*631

•tf 1IC58767
...... M M microfilmed.

U MC 5*7 (=1

1

RED DOME ill PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Sock 11 page 449 on September 5,
19^6.

2)

Claim located September 5, 1946

3)

Legal Description
Lot 1; & beg. 10 chains West of the
of the Northeast 1/4 running thence
thenca North 20 chains, thence East
South 20 chains to beg., all in Sec
South, Range 6 bleat, S.L.S. & M.

4)

Southeast corner
West 40 chains,
40 chains, thenca
26, Township 21

Owners are
Red Dame, Inc
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT e463I
Fillmore Products, Inc
Lessee
SR Sax 125
Fillmore, UT 8^631

,»*•'"*'"*

>Ulwd 5 8 7 o o

TJMC Sin?

'•J Vi \J '± J

RED DOME U2 PLACES MINING CLAIM
MILLARO COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notica of Location rscorded at eook 9 page 5<»3 on July 21, 1936.

2)

Claim located an July 21, 1936.

3)

An amendment recorded at Book 9 page 5SQ on April U, 1937.

<0

Legal Description
The East one-fifth (1/5) of Lot 1, all of Lot 2, and
all of Lot 3 in Section 23, Township 21 South, Range
6 viiest, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. Lot 2, Section 26
Township 21 South, Range 6 Idesi, Salt Laka Base Z.
Meridian.

5) Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT 8^631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee

SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT e<f631

f ? £ f ST.w «

"'an automated

^

5S<e5

wrc St^l
UM
L* V** O

i -A-

RED DOME »2 PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Laaction recorded at 8ook 9 page 544 an July 21, 1936«

2)

Claim located on July 21, 1936.

3)

An amendment recorded at Soak 9 page 580 on April 6, 1937.

4)

Legal Description
The South three-fourths (3/4) of the West four-fifths
(4/5) of Lot 1, in Section 23, Township 21 South,
Range 6 blest9 Salt Lake Base I Meridian, and all of
Lot 4 in Section 25, Township 21 South, Range 6 West,
Salt Lake Base l Meridian.

5)

Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT 84631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT 84631

BLM
l

I'"'**"*

Oata

uwjdocument
^ n ^ n automated!

Inas1

V>T$0

58T70

RED DOME »h PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560 on October 26, 1936.

2)

Claim located on October 19, 1936.

3)

Legal Description
The North quarter of the Uest four-fifths ( V 5 ) of
Lot 1 and commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot
1 and running thence North 16 chains; thence East
18 chains; thence South 16 chains; and thence West
18 chains; all in Section 23, Township 21 South,
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Sase I Meridian,

U)

Owners:
Red Dome, Inc.
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT 8<*631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lassee
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT 8<*631

\3

•

$

&

58771

RED DOME 115 PLACES MIMING CLAIMS
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
)

Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560

)

Claim located on October 19, 1936.

)

Legal Description
4.5 Acres being part of the Northeast 1/4 of the South
east 1/4 of Section ^7, and also part of the lot 5,
Section 26 Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake
Sase I Meridian and more particularly described as
fallows:
Commencing 3 chains lilest of the East 1/4 corner of
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 Uest, Salt
Lake Sase I Meridian, and running thence South 5
chains; thence East 9 chains; thence North 5 chains
thence West 9 chains to the point of beginning.

)

Owners:
Red Dame, Inc.
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT G4631
Fillmore Products, Inc«
Lessee
SH Box 125
Fillmore, UT 84631

v> i&

58772

RED DOME #b
MILLAR

j£^ ^INING CLAIM
,.-

» raw

page 2S3 an 2i

3j.t> urt June 2B, 1939.
--. Rescript ion
.* .* w a of the Southwes b L U at bastion c.jf
j«Mea3t !/<» or w e -u"
q lt L a k e QasB i
Tin 21 South, Range o West, bai- w
5) Owners:
Reel Ocme, Inc..
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT 8^631
Fillmore Products, Inc
Lessee
SR Sax 125
Fillmore, UT 8**631

u«e

sema

RED DOME }P PLACER MINING CLAIM
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH
1) Natica of Location recorded at eook 10 page 2S5 on July 1, 1938.
2)

Claim located on July 1, 1938.

3)

Legal Description
Lot 1 and the North three-fourths ( 3 A ) of Lot 2',
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt
Lake Sase & Meridian.

k)

Owners:
Red Dame, Inc.
SR Box 125
Fillmara, UT 8U631
Fillmore Products, Inc.
Lessee
SR Sox 125
Fillmore, UT 8<*S31

XJ M<C 58774

RED DOME rC'jJ DISCOVERY P U i Z H I M I M I I

;, '« i

MILLARD CCUIMTY, UTAH

1)

N o t i c e of L o c a t i o n recorded at Ekioki ] 2 page 339 an Juna Hf I'jbU,

2)

Claim located an jtjni

3)

Legal D e s c r i p t i o n

I11 , J, 950,

Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 22,
Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian and running thence We3t 80 rnds; thence
North SO rods; thence East 30 rods; thence South
80 rods to the point of deg.
<0

Owner s:
Red Dome, If iin:
SH 3ox 125
Fillmore, Ul BU 631
Fillmore P r a d t i c t s, Inc..
Lessee
SR Box 125
Fillmore, UT 8U631

<Uv\<L

59192
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UNITED STATES ET AL. V. LOCKE ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
No. 83-1394. Argued November 6, 1984—Decided April 1, 1985
Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA) establishes a federal recording system that is designed to rid
federal lands of stale mining claims and to provide federal land managers with up-to-date information that allows them to make informed
land management decisions. Section 314(b) requires that mining claims
located prior to FLPMA's enactment be initially recorded with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within three years of the enactment,
and § 314(a) requires that the claimant, in the year of initial recording
and "prior to December 31" of every year after that, file with state
officials and the BLM a notice of intention to hold a claim, an affidavit of
assessment work performed on the claim, or a detailed reporting form.
Section 314(c) provides that failure to comply with either of these requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment''
of the claim. Appellees, who had purchased mining claims before 1976,
complied with the initial recording requirement but failed to meet
on time their first annual filing requirement, not filing with the BLM
until December 31. Subsequently, the BLM notified appellees that
their claims had been declared abandoned and void due to their tardy
filing. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, appellees filed an
action in Federal District Court, alleging that § 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property without just compensation and denied
them due process. The District Court issued summary judgment in
appellees' fkvor, holding that § 314(c) created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that claimants who fail to make a timely filing intended
to abandon their claims. Alternatively, the court held that the 1-day
late filing "substantially complied" with § 314(a) and the implementing
regulations.
Held:
1. Section 314(a)'s plain language—"prior to December 31"—read in
conjunction with BLM regulations makes clear that the annual filings
must be made on or before December 30. Thus, the BLM did not act
ultra vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely. Pp. 93-96.
2. Congress intended in § 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which
timely filings were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is
made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time, in and of itself,
causes a claim to be lost. Pp. 97-100.
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3. The annual filing deadline cannot be complied with, substantially or
otherwise, by filing late—even by one day. Pp. 100-102.
4. Section 314(c) is not unconstitutional. Pp. 103-110.
(a) Congress was well within its affirmative powers in enacting the
filing requirement, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment in § 314(c),
and in applying the requirement and sanction to claims located before
FLPMA was enacted. Pp. 104-107.
(b) Appellees' property loss was one they could have avoided with
minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time, not Congress' action,
that caused their property rights to be extinguished. Regulation of
property rights does not "take" private property when an individual's
reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized
as long as he complies with reasonable regulations. Pp. 107-108.
(c) FLPMA provides appellees with all the process that is their
constitutional due. The Act's recording provisions clearly afford those
within the Act's reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those
requirements. As the Act constitutes purely economic regulation,
Congress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable to place a
substantial portion of the burden on claimants to make the national
recording system work. Pp. 108-110.
573 F. Supp. 472, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 110. POWELL, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, post, p. 112. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,

in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 117.

Carolyn F. Corurin argued the cause for appellants. With
her on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne,
David C. Shilton, and Arthur E. Gowran.
Harold A. Swafford argued the cause for appellees. With
him on the brief was John W. Hoffman.*
*Laurens H. Silver and John Leshy filed a brief for the Sierra Club
as amicus curiae urging reversal
Briefs of amid curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Nevada by Brian McKay, Attorney General, and James C. Smith, Deputy
Attorney General; for the Alaska Miners Association et al. by Ranald A.
Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett; for the Colorado Mining Association by
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question presented by this appeal is whether
the Constitution prevents Congressfromproviding that holders of unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with the
annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744, shall
forfeit their claims,
I
From the enactment of the general mining laws in the 19th
century until 1976, those who sought to make their living by
locating and developing minerals on federal lands were virtually unconstrained by the fetters of federal control The
general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., still in effect
today, allow United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop certain minerals. "Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed by
the minimal procedures required to formally "locate" the deposit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession of
the land for mining purposes, 30 U. S. C. § 26; as long as $100
of assessment work is performed annually, the individual
may continue to extract and sell minerals from the claim
without paying any royalty to the United States, 30 U. S. C.
§ 28. For a nominal sum, and after certain statutory conditions are fulfilled, an individual may patent the claim,
thereby purchasing from the Federal Government the land
and minerals and obtaining ultimate title to them. Patenting, however, is not required, and an unpatented mining
claim remains a fully recognized possessory interest. Best
v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335 (1963).
By the 1960's, it had become clear that this 19th-century
laissez-faire regime had created virtual chaos with respect to
the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that more than
JUSTICE MARSHALL

Randy L. Parcel; for Mobil Oil Corp. by Stephen D. Alfers and William A.
Hillhou8e II; and for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by K. Preston
Oade, Jr.

UNITED STATES u LOCKE
84

87

Opinion of the Court

6 million unpatented mining claims existed on public lands
other than the national forests; in addition, more than half
the land in the National Forest System was thought to be
covered by such claims. S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 (1975).
Many of these claims had been dormant for decades, and
many were invalid for other reasons, but in the absence of a
federal recording system, no simple way existed for determining which public lands were subject to mining locations,
and whether those locations were valid or invalid. Ibid. As
a result, federal land managers had to proceed slowly and
cautiously in taking any action affecting federal land lest the
federal property rights of claimants be unlawfully disturbed.
Each time the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed
a sale or other conveyance of federal land, a title search in
the county recorder's office was necessary; if an outstanding
mining claim was found, no matter how stale or apparently
abandoned, formal administrative adjudication was required
to determine the validity of the claim.1
After more than a decade of studying this problem in
the context of a broader inquiry into the proper management of the public lands in the modern era, Congress in
1976 enacted FLPMA, Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq.). Section 314 of the
Act establishes a federal recording system that is designed
both to rid federal lands of stale mining claims and to
provide federal land managers with up-to-date information that allows them to make informed land management
decisions.2 For claims located before FLPMA's enact1

See generally Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of
Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219.
'The text of 43 U. S. C. § 1744 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
"(a) Filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
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ment,3 the federal recording system imposes two general
requirements- First, the claims must initially be registered
with the BLM by filing, within three years of FLPMA's
enactment, a copy of the official record of the notice or cer1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. . . .
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to befiledwhen there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit
of assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
u
(b) Additional filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by
the Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim
or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date
of location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
a
(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely
filing
"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and
(b) of this subsection shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall
not be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site."
S
A somewhat different scheme applies to claims located after October
21, 1976, the date the Act took effect.
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tificate of location* 90 Stat. 2743, § 314(b), 43 U. S. C.
§ 1744(b). Second, in the year of the initial recording, and
"prior to December 31" of every year after that, the claimant
must file with state officials and with BLM a notice of intention to hold the claim, an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim, or a detailed reporting form. 90 Stat.
2743, § 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a). Section 314(c) of the
Act provides that failure to comply with either of these
requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment of the mining claim . . . by the owner." 43
U. S. C. § 1744(c).
The second of these requirements—the annual filing obligation—has created the dispute underlying this appeal.
Appellees, four individuals engaged "in the business of operating mining properties in Nevada,"4 purchased in 1960 and
1966 10 unpatented mining claims on public lands near Ely,
Nevada. These claims were major sources of gravel and
building material: the claims are valued at several million
dollars,5 and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, appellees' gross income totaled more than $1 million.6 Throughout the period during which they owned the claims, appellees
complied with annual state-law filing and assessment work
requirements. In addition, appellees satisfied FLPMA's
initial recording requirement by properly filing with BLM a
notice of location, thereby putting their claims on record
for purposes of FLPMA.
At the end of 1980, however, appellees failed to meet on
time theirfirstannual obligation tofilewith the Federal Government. After allegedly receiving misleading information
from a BLM employee,7 appellees waited until December 31
4

Complaint 12.
'Id., 115.
•573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (1983). From 1960 to 1980, total gross income
from the claims exceeded $4 million. Ibid.
7
An affidavit submitted to the District Court by one of appellees'
employees stated that BLM officials in Ely had told the employee that the
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to submit to BLM the annual notice of intent to hold or proof
of assessment work performed required under § 314(a) of
FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), As noted above, that section requires these documents to be filed annually "prior to
December 31.* Had appellees checked, they further would
have discovered that BLM regulations made quite clear that
claimants were required to make the annual filings in the
proper BLM office "on or before December 30 of each calendar year." 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a) (1980) (current version at
43 CFR §3833.2-l(b)(l) (1984)). Thus, appellees'filingwas
one day too late.
This fact was brought painfully home to appellees when
they received a letterfromthe BLM Nevada State Office informing them that their claims had been declared abandoned
and void due to their tardy filing. In many cases, loss of a
claim in this way would have minimal practical effect; the
filing could be made at the BLM Reno office "on or before December 31,
1980." Affidavit of Laura C. Locke 13. The 1978 version of a BLM question and answer pamphlet erroneously stated that the annual filings had to
be made "on or before December 31* of each year. Staking a Mining
Claim on Federal Lands 9-10 (1978). Later versions have corrected this
error to bring the pamphlet into accord with the BLM regulations that
require the filings to be made "on or before December 30."
JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE POWELL seek to make much of this
pamphlet and of the uncontroverted evidence that appellees were told a
December 31 filing would comply with the statute. See post, at 117, 122,
128. However, at the time appellees filed in 1980, BLM regulations and
the then-current pamphlets made clear that the filing was required "on or
before December 30." Thus, the dissenters' reliance on this pamphlet
would seem better directed to the claim that the United States was equitably estopped from forfeiting appellees' claims, given the advice of the BLM
agent and the objective basis the 1978 pamphlet provides for crediting the
claim that such advice was given. The District Court did not consider this
estoppel claim. Without expressing any view as to whether, as a matter
of law, appellees could prevail on such a theory, see Heckler v. Community
Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984), we leave
any further treatment of this issue, including fuller development of the
record, to the District Court on remand.
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claimant could simply locate the same claim again and then
rerecord it with BLM. In this case, however, relocation of
appellees' claims, which were initially located by appellees'
predecessors in 1952 and 1954, was prohibited by the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. §611; that Act prospectively barred location of the sort of minerals yielded by
appellees' claims. Appellees' mineral deposits thus escheated to the Government.
After losing an administrative appeal, appellees filed the
present action in the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada. Their complaint alleged, inter alia,
that § 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property without just compensation and denied them due process.
On summary judgment, the District Court held that § 314(c)
did indeed deprive appellees of the process to which they
were constitutionally due. 573 F. Supp. 472 (1983). The
District Court reasoned that § 314(c) created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that claimants who failed to
make a timely filing intended to abandon their claims.
Rather than relying on this presumption, the Government
was obliged, in the District Court's view, to provide individualized notice to claimants that their claims were in danger of
being lost, followed by a post-filing-deadline hearing at which
the claimants could demonstrate that they had not, in fact,
abandoned a claim. Alternatively, the District Court held
that the 1-day late filing "substantially complied" with the
Act and regulations.
Because a District Court had held an Act of Congress unconstitutional in a civil suit to which the United States was
a party, we noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252. 467 U. S. 1225 (1984).8 We now reverse.
'That the District Court decided the case on both constitutional and
statutory grounds does not affect this Court's obligation under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252 to take jurisdiction over the case; as long as the unconstitutionality
of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of decision below in a civil suit
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II
Appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 brings before this Court
not merely the constitutional question decided below, but the
entire case. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31
(1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U- S. 17, 27, n. 7 (1960).
The entire case includes nonconstitutional questions actually
decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional
grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court.
United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27-28 (1980).9 These
principles are important aids in the prudential exercise of our
appellate jurisdiction, for when a case arrives here by appeal
under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, this Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the
Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground
fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be
avoided. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 741-744
(1984); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974);
cf. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,
335 U. S. 106, 110 (1948) (appeals under former Criminal
Appeals Act); see generally Ashwander v. TVA} 297 U. S.
288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Thus, we turn
first to the nonconstitutional questions pressed below.
to which the United States is a party, appeal lies directly to this Court.
United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 541 (1939).
Another District Court in the West similarly has declared § 314(c) unconstitutional with respect to invalidation of claims based on failure to meet
the initial recordation requirements of § 314(a) in timely fashion. Rogers
v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (Mont. 1982).
•When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by the
lower court, we may vacate the decision below and remand with instructions that those questions be decided, see Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S.
231 (1976), or we may choose to decide those questions ourselves without
benefit of lower court analysis, see United States v. Clark. The choice
between these options depends on the extent to which lower court
factfinding and analysis of the nonconstitutional questions will be necessary
or useful to our disposition of those questions.
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III
A
Before the District Court, appellees asserted that the
§ 314(a) requirement of afiling"prior to December 31 of each
year" should be construed to require a filing "on or before
December 3L" Thus, appellees argued, their December 31
filing had in fact complied with the statute, and the BLM
had acted ultra vires in voiding their claims.
Although the District Court did not address this argument,
the argument raises a question sufficiently legal in nature
that we choose to address it even in the absence of lower
court analysis. See, e. g., United States v. Clark, supra.
It is clear to us that the plain language of the statute simply
cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on it. As even
counsel for appellees conceded at oral argument, § 314(a) 'Is a
statement that Congress wanted it filed by December 30th.
I think that is a clear statement. . . ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27;
see also id., at 37 ("A literal reading of the statute would
require a December 30th filing . . ."). While we will not
allow a literal reading of a statute to produce a result
"demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,"
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571
(1982), with respect to filing deadlines a literal reading of
Congress' words is generally the only proper reading of those
words. To attempt to decide whether some date other than
the one set out in the statute is the date actually "intended"
by Congress is to set sail on an aimless journey, for the
purpose of afilingdeadline would be just as well served by
nearly any date a court might choose as by the date Congress
has in fact set out in the statute. "Actual purpose is
sometimes unknown," United Slates Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 180 (1980) (STEVENS, J.,
concurring), and such is the case with filing deadlines;
as might be expected, nothing in the legislative history suggests why Congress chose December 30 over December 31,
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or over September 1 (the end of the assessment year for
mining claims, 30 U. S. C. §28), as the last day on which
the required filings could be made. But "[deadlines are
inherently arbitrary,,, while fixed dates "are often essential
to accomplish necessary results." United States v. Boyle,
469 U. S. 241, 249 (1984). Faced with the inherent arbitrariness offilingdeadlines, we must, at least in a civil case,
apply by its terms the datefixedby the statute. Cf. United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, supra, at 179.l0
Moreover, BLM regulations have made absolutely clear
since the enactment of FLPMA that "prior to December 31"
means what it says. As the current version of the filing
regulations states:
"The owner of an unpatented mining claim located on
Federal lands . . . shall havefiledor caused to have been
filed on or before December 30 of each calendar year . . .
evidence of annual assessment work performed during
the previous assessment year or a notice of intention to
hold the mining claim." 43 CFR §3833.2-l(b)(l) (1984)
(emphasis added).
See also 43 CFR § 3833.2-l(a) (1982) (same); 43 CFR § 3833.21(a) (1981) (same); 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a) (1980) (same); 43
CFR §3833.2-l(a) (1979) (same); 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a)(l)
(1978) ("prior to" Dec. 31); 43 CFR § 3833.2-l(a)(l) (1977)
("prior to" Dec. 31). Leading mining treatises similarly
* Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392-398 (1982). Whether this general principle
applies to deadlines that run in favor of the Government is a question on
which we express no opinion today. In addition, no showing has been
made that appellees were in any way "unable to exercise the usual care and
diligence" that would have allowed them to meet the filing deadline or to
learn of its existence. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U. S. 241, 253
(1985) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Of course, at issue in Boyle was an explicit provision in the Internal Revenue Code that provided a reasonablecause exception to the Code's filing deadlines, while FLPMA contains no
analogous provision.
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inform claimants that "[i]t is important to note that the filing
of a notice of intention or evidence of assessment work must
be done prior to December 31 of each year, i. e., on or before
December 30." 2 American Law of Mining § 7.23D, p. 150,2
(Supp. 1983) (emphasis in original); see also 23 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 25 (1977) (same). If appellees,
who were businessmen involved in the running of a major
mining operation for more than 20 years, had any questions
about whether a December 31 filing complied with the statute, it was incumbent upon them, as it is upon other businessmen, see United States v. Boyle, supra, to have checked the
regulations or to have consulted an attorney for legal advice.
Pursuit of either of these courses, rather than the submission
of a last-minutefiling,would surely have led appellees to the
conclusion that December 30 was the last day on which they
could file safely.
In so saying, we are not insensitive to the problems posed
by congressional reliance on the words "prior to December
31." See post, p. 117 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the
fact that Congress might have acted with greater clarity or
foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve that which Congress is-perceived
to have failed to do. "There is a basic difference between
filling a gap left by Congress* silence and rewriting rules that
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted." Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978). Nor
is the Judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the clear import
of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those
words lead to a harsh result. See Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Wvrkers, 451 U. S. 77, 98 (1981). On the contrary, deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well
as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a bill, generally requires us to assume that "the
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9
(1962). "Going behind the plain language of a statute in
search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is 'a step to
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be taken cautiously' even under the best of circumstances."
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 75 (1982)
(quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1,
26 (1977)). When even after taking this step nothing in the
legislative history remotely suggests a congressional intent
contrary to Congress' chosen words, and neither appellees
nor the dissenters have pointed to anything that so suggests,
any further steps take the courts out of the realm of interpretation and place them in the domain of legislation. The
phrase "prior to" may be clumsy, but its meaning is clear.11
Under these circumstances, we are obligated to apply the
"prior to December 31" language by its terms. See, e. g.,
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, supra, at 68; Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S.
102, 108 (1980).
The agency's regulations clarify and confirm the import
of the statutory language by making clear that the annual
filings must be made on or before December 30. These regulations provide a conclusive answer to appellees' claim, for
where the language of afilingdeadline is plain and the agency's construction completely consistent with that language,
the agency's construction simply cannot be found ^sufficiently
unreasonable" as to be unacceptable. FEC v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981).
We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of disingenuous evasion" even to avoid a constitutional question.
Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933)
(Cardozo, J.).12 We therefore hold that BLM did not act
ultra vires in concluding that appellees'filingwas untimely.
11

Legislative drafting books are filled with suggestions that the phrase
"prior to" be replaced with the word "before," see, e. g., R. Dickerson,
Materials on Legal Drafting 293 (1981), but we have seen no suggestion
that "prior to" be replaced with "on or before"—a phrase with obviously
different substantive content.
* We note that the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions that
require action "prior to" some date, including at least 14 provisions that
contemplate action "prior to December 31." See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5); 12
U. S. C. § 1709(o)(l)(E); 12 U. S. C. § 1823(g); 12 U. S. C. § 1841(a)(5)(A);
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B
Section 314(c) states that failure to comply with the filing
requirements of §§ 314(a) and 314(b) "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim."
We must next consider whether this provision expresses a
congressional intent to extinguish all claims for which filings
have not been made, or only those claims for which filings
have not been made and for which the claimants have a
specific intent to abandon the claim. The District Court
adopted the latter interpretation, and on that basis concluded
that § 314(c) created a constitutionally impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment. The District Court reasoned that, once Congress had chosen to make loss of a claim
turn on the specific intent of the claimant, a prior hearing
and findings on the claimant's intent were constitutionally
required before the claim of a nonfiling claimant could be
extinguished.
In concluding that Congress was concerned with the specific intent of the claimant even when the claimant had failed
22 U. S. a § 3784(c); 26 U. S. C. § 503(d)(1); 33 U. S. C. § 1319(a)(5)(B);
42 U. S. C. §415(a)(7)(E)(ii) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill); 42 U. S. C. §1962(d>17(b); 42 U. S. C. § 5614(b)(5); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2); 42 U. S. C. § 7521
(b)(2); 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a); 50 U. S. C. App. § 1741(b)(1). Dozens of state
statutes and local ordinances undoubtedly incorporate similar "prior to
December 31" deadlines. In addition, legislatures know how to make explicit an intent to allow action on December 31 when they employ a December
31 date in a statute. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(2); 22 U. S. C. §§ 3303
(b)(3)(B) and (c); 43 U. S. C. § 256a.
It is unclear whether the arguments advanced by the dissenters are
meant to apply to all of these provisions, or only to some of them; if the
latter, we are given little guidance as to how a court is to go about the
rather eclectic task of choosing which "prior to December 31" deadlines
it can interpret "flexibly." Understandably enough, the dissenters seek
to disavow any intent to call all these "prior to December 31" deadlines
into question and assure us that this is a "unique case," post, at 117, n. 4
(POWELL, J., dissenting), involving a "unique factual matrix,** post, at
128 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The only thing we can find unique about
this particular December 31 deadline is that the dissenters are willing
to go through such tortured reasoning to evade it.
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to make the required filings, the District Court began from
the fact that neither § 314(c) nor the Act itself defines the
term "abandonment" as that term appears in § 314(c). The
District Court then noted correctly that the common law of
mining traditionally has drawn a distinction between "abandonment" of a claim, which occurs only upon a showing of the
claimant's intent to relinquish the claim, and "forfeiture" of a
claim, for which only noncompliance with the requirements of
law must be shown. See, e. g.,2 American Law of Mining
§8.2, pp. 195-196 (1983) (relied upon by the District Court).
Given that Congress had not expressly stated in the statute
any intent to departfromthe term-of-art meaning of "abandonment" at common law, the District Court concluded that
§ 314(c) was intended to incorporate the traditional commonlaw distinction between abandonment and forfeiture. Thus,
reasoned the District Court, Congress did not intend to cause
a forfeiture of claims for which the required filings had not
been made, but rather to focus on the claimant's actual intent. As a corollary, the District Court understood the failure to file to have been intended to be merely one piece of
evidence in a factual inquiry into whether a claimant had a
specific intent to abandon his property.
This construction of the statutory scheme cannot withstand
analysis. While reference to common-law conceptions is
often a helpful guide to interpreting open-ended or undefined
statutory terms, see, e. g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453
U. S. 322, 329 (1981); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U. S. 1, 59 (1911), this principle is a guide to legislative
intent, not a talisman of it, and the principle is not to be
applied in defiance of a statute's overriding purposes and
logic. Although § 314(c) is couched in terms of a conclusive
presumption of "abandonment," there can be little doubt that
Congress intended § 314(c) to cause a forfeiture of all claims
for which the filing requirements of §§ 314(a) and 314(b) had
not been met.
To begin with, the Senate version of § 314(c) provided that
any claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively pre-
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sumed to be abandoned and shall be void." S. 507, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., §311 (1975).13 The Committee Report
accompanying S. 507 repeatedly indicated that failure to
comply with the filing requirements would make a claim
"void." See S. Rep. No. 94-583, pp. 65, 66 (1975). The
House legislation and Reports merely repeat the statutory
language without offering any explanation of it, but it is
clearfromthe Conference Committee Report that the undisputed intent of the Senate—to make "void" those claims for
which properfilingswere not timely made—was the intent of
both Chambers. The Report stated: "Both the Senate bill
and House amendments provided for recordation of mining
claims and for extinguishment of abandoned claims." H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1724, p. 62 (1976) (emphasis added).
In addition, the District Court's construction fails to give
effect to the "deemed conclusively" language of § 314(c). If
the failure to file merely shifts the burden to the claimant to
prove that he intends to keep the claim, nothing "conclusive"
is achieved by § 314(c). The District Court sought to avoid
this conclusion by holding that § 314(c) does extinguish
automatically those claims for which initial recordings, as
opposed to annual filings, have not been made; the District
Court attempted to justify its distinction between initial
recordings and annual filings on the ground that the dominant purpose of § 314(c) was to avoid forcing BLM to the
"awesome task of searching every local title record" to establish initially a federal recording system. 573 F. Supp., at
477. Once this purpose had been satisfied by an initial recording, the primary purposes of the "deemed conclusively"
language, in the District Court's view, had been met. But
the clear language of § 314(c) admits of no distinction between
u

The Senate bill required only initial recordings, not annual filings, but
this factor is not significant in light of the actions of the Conference Committee; the clear structure of the Senate bill was to impose the sanction of
claim extinguishment on those who failed to make whatever filings federal
law required.
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initial recordings and annualfilings:failure to do either "shall
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment."
And the District Court's analysis of the purposes of § 314(c)
is also misguided, for the annualfilingrequirements serve a
purpose similar to that of the initial recording requirement;
millions of claims undoubtedly have now been recorded, and
the presence of an annual filing obligation allows BLM to
keep the system established in §314 up to date on a yearly
basis. To put the burden on BLM to keep this system current through its own inquiry into the status of recorded
claims would lead to a situation similar to that which led
Congress initially to make the federal recording system selfexecuting. The purposes of a self-executing recording system are implicated similarly, if somewhat less substantially,
by both the annualfilingobligation and the initial recording
requirement, and the District Court was not empowered to
thwart these purposes or the clear language of § 314(c) by
concluding that § 314(c) was actually concerned with only
initial recordings.
For these reasons, we find that Congress intended in
§ 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which timely filings
were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is
simply made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure tofileon time,
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. See Western
Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F. 2d 618, 628 (CA9 1981).
C
Afinalstatutory question must be resolved before we turn
to the constitutional holding of the District Court. Relying
primarily on Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U. S. 48 (1970),
the District Court held that, even if the statute required a
filing on or before December 30, appellees had "substantially
complied" byfilingon December 31. We cannot accept this
view of the statute.
The notion that afilingdeadline can be complied with by
filing sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the
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least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting
principle. If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late
filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing
deadline; yet regardless of where the eutoff line is set, some
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it. Filing
deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate
harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall
just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing
deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced. "Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging
a lax attitude toward filing dates," United States v. Boyle,
469 U. S., at 249. A filing deadline cannot be complied
with, substantially or otherwise, byfilinglate—even by one
day. Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., supra, does not support a
contrary conclusion. Hickel suggested, although it did not
hold, that failure to meet the annual assessment work requirements of the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §28,
which require that "not less than $100 worth of labor shall
be performed or improvements made during each year,"
would not render a claim automatically void. Instead, if
an individual complied substantially but not fully with the
requirement, he might under some circumstances be able to
retain possession of his claim.
These suggestions in Hickel do not afford a safe haven to
mine owners who fail to meet their filing obligations under
any federal mining law. Failure to comply fully with the
physical requirement that a certain amount of work be performed each year is significantly different from the complete
failure to file on time documents that federal law commands
be filed. In addition, the general mining laws at issue in
Hickel do not clearly provide that a claim will be lost for failure to meet the assessment work requirements. Thus, it
was open to the Court to conclude in Hickel that Congress
had intended to make the asbessment work requirement
merely an indicium of a claimant's specific intent to retain a
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claim. Full compliance with the assessment work requirements would establish conclusively an intent to keep the
claim, but less than full compliance would not by force of law
operate to deprive the claimant of his claim. Instead, less
than full compliance would subject the mine owner to a caseby-case determination of whether he nonetheless intended to
keep his claim. See Hickel, supra, at 56-57.
In this case, the statute explicitly provides that failure to
comply with the applicable filing requirements leads automatically to loss of the claim. See Part II-B, supra. Thus,
Congress has made it unnecessary to ascertain whether the
individual in fact intends to abandon the claim, and there is
no room to inquire whether substantial compliance is indicative of the claimant's intent—intent is simply irrelevant if the
required filings are not made. Hickel's discussion of substantial compliance is therefore inapposite to the statutory
scheme at issue here. As a result, Hickel gives miners no
greater latitude with filing deadlines than other individuals
have.14
"Since 1982, BLM regulations have provided that filings due on or
before December 30 will be considered timely if postmarked on or before
December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on the following January 19. 43CFR§3833.0-5(m)(1983). Appellees and the dissenters attempt to transform this regulation into a blank check generally authorizing "substantial compliance" with the filing requirements. We
disagree for two reasons. First, the regulation was not in effect when
appellees filed in 1980; it therefore cannot now be relied on to validate a
purported "substantial compliance" in 1980. Second, that an agency has
decided to take account of holiday mail delays by treating as timely filed a
document postmarked on the statutory filing date does not require the
agency to accept all documents hand-delivered any time before January 19.
The agency rationally could decide that either of the options in this sort of
situation—requiring mailings to be received by the same date that handdeliveries must be made or requiring mailings to be postmarked by that
date—is a sound way of administering the statute.
JUSTICE STEVENS further suggests that BLM would have been well
within its authority to promulgate regulations construing the statute to
allow for December 31 filings. Assuming the correctness of this sugges-
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IV
Much of the District Court's constitutional discussion necessarily falls with our conclusion that § 314(c) automatically
deems forfeited those claims for which the required filings
are not timely made. The District Court's invalidation of the
statute rested heavily on the view that § 314(c) creates an
"irrebuttable presumption that mining claims are abandoned
if the miner fails to timelyfile"the required documents—that
the statute presumes a failure to file to signify a specific
intent to abandon the claim. But, as we have just held,
§ 314(c) presumes nothing about a claimant's actual intent;
the statute simply and conclusively deems such claims to be
forfeited. As a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) is not subject to
the individualized hearing requirement of such irrebuttable
presumption cases as Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973),
or Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632
(1974), for there is nothing to suggest that, in enacting
§ 314(c), Congress was in any way concerned with whether a
particular claimant's tardyfilingor failure tofileindicated an
actual intent to abandon the claim.
There are suggestions in the District Court's opinion that,
even understood as a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) might be
unconstitutional. We therefore go on to consider whether
automatic forfeiture of a claim for failure to make annual
filings is constitutionally permissible. The framework for
analysis of this question, in both its substantive and procedural dimensions, is set forth by our recent decision in
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982). There we
upheld a state statute pursuant to which a severed mineral
interest that had not been used for a period of 20 years automatically lapsed and reverted to the current surface owner of
the property, unless the mineral owner filed a statement of
tion, the fact that two interpretations of a statute are equally reasonable
suggests to us that the agency's interpretation is sufficiently reasonable as
to be acceptable. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981).
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claim in the county recorder's office within 2 years of the
statute's passage.
A
Under Texaco, we must first address the question of
affirmative legislative power whether Congress is authorized to "provide that property rights of this character shall
be extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative
action required by the" statute. Id., at 525. Even with
respect to vested property rights, a legislature generally has
the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way
in which those rights are used, or to condition their continued
retention on performance of certain affirmative duties. As
long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction designed to further legitimate legislative objectives, the
legislature acts within its powers in imposing such new constraints or duties. See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty, Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Turner v. New York, 168
U. S. 90, 94 (1897); Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514, 517
(1883); Terry v. Andersen, 95 U. S. 628 (1877). "[Legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely
because it upsets otherwise settled expectations." Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16 (1976) (citations
omitted).
This power to qualify existing property rights is particularly broad with respect to the "character" of the property
rights at issue here. Although owners of unpatented mining
claims hold fully recognized possessory interests in their
claims, see Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S.
334, 335 (1963), we have recognized that these interests are a
"unique form of property." Ibid. The United States, as
owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain, maintains broad powers over the terms and conditions upon which
the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired. See,
e. g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976).
"A mining location which has not gone to patent is of no
higher quality and no more immunefromattack and in-
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vestigation than are unpatented claims under the homestead and kindred laws. If valid, it gives to the claimant
certain exclusive possessory rights, and so do homestead
and desert claims. But no right arises from an invalid
claim of any kind. All must conform to the law under
which they are initiated; otherwise they work an unlawful private appropriation in derogation of the rights of
the public." Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450,
460 (1920).
Claimants thus must take their mineral interests with the
knowledge that the Government retains substantial regulatory power over those interests. Cf. Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 413
(1983). In addition, the property right here is the right to a
flow of income from production of the claim. Similar vested
economic rights are held subject to the Government's substantial power to regulate for the public good the conditions
under which business is carried out and to redistribute the
benefits and burdens of economic life. See, e. g., National
Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co., 470 U. S. 451, 468-469 (1985); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., supra; see generally Walls v. Midland Carbon
Co., 254 U. S. 300, 315 (1920) ("[I]n the interest of the community, [government may] limit one [right] that others may
be enjoyed").
Against this background, there can be no doubt that Congress could condition initial receipt of an unpatented mining
claim upon an agreement to perform annual assessment work
and make annual filings. That this requirement was applied
to claims already located by the time FLPMA was enacted
and thus applies to vested claims does not alter the analysis,
for any "retroactive application of [FLPMA] is supported by
a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means."
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray &
Co., 467 U. S. 717, 729 (1984). The purposes of applying
FLPMA's filing provisions to claims located before the Act
was passed—to rid federal lands of stale mining claims and to
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provide for centralized collection by federal land managers
of comprehensive and up-to-date information on the status of
recorded but unpatented mining claims—are clearly legitimate. In addition, § 314(c) is a reasonable, if severe, means
of furthering these goals; sanctioning with loss of their claims
those claimants who fail to file provides a powerful motivation to comply with the filing requirement, while automatic
invalidation for noncompliance enables federal land managers
to know with certainty and ease whether a claim is currently
valid. Finally, the restriction attached to the continued
retention of a mining claim imposes the most minimal of
burdens on claimants; they must simply file a paper once a
year indicating that the required assessment work has been
performed or that they intend to hold the claim.15 Indeed,
15

Appellees suggest that Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982),
further requires that the restriction imposed be substantively reasonable
in the sense that it adequately relate to some common-law conception of the
nature of the property right involved. Thus, appellees point to the fact
that, in Texaco, failure to file could produce a forfeiture only if, in addition,
the mineral interest had lain dormant for 20 years; according to appellees,
conjunction of a 20-year dormancy period with failure to file a statement
of claim sufficiently indicated abandonment, as that term is understood
at common law, to justify the statute.
Common-law principles do not, however, entitle an individual to retain
his property until the common law would recognize it as abandoned. Legislatures can enact substantive rules of law that treat property as forfeited
under conditions that the common law would not consider sufficient to indicate abandonment. See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 467
(1831) ("What is the evidence of an individual having abandoned his rights
or property? It is clear that the subject is one over which every community is at liberty to make a rule for itself"). As long as proper notice
of these rules exists, and the burdens they impose are not so wholly disproportionate to the burdens other individuals face in a highly regulated
society that some people are being forced "alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, must be borne by the public as a whole,"
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960), the burden imposed is
a reasonable restriction on the property right. Here Congress has chosen
to redefine the way in which an unpatented mining claim can be lost
through imposition of a filing requirement that serves valid public objec-
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appellees could have fully protected their interests against
the effect of the statute by taking the minimal additional step
of patenting the claims. As a result, Congress was well
within its affirmative powers in enacting the filing requirement, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment set forth in
§ 314(c), and in applying the requirement and sanction to
claims located before FLPMA was passed.
B
We look next to the substantive effect of § 314(c) to determine whether Congress is nonetheless barred from enacting
it because it works an impermissible intrusion on constitutionally protected rights. With respect to the regulation of
private property, any such protection must come from the
Fifth Amendment's proscription against the taking of private
property without just compensation. On this point, however, Texaco is controlling: "this Court has never required
[Congress] to compensate the owner for the consequences of
his own neglect." 454 U. S., at 530. Appellees failed to
inform themselves of the proper filing deadline and failed to
file in timely fashion the documents required by federal law.
Their property loss was one appellees could have avoided
with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time—
not the action of Congress—that caused the property right
to be extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not
'take" private property when an individual's reasonable,
investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized
as long as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions
the legislature has imposed. See, e. g., Miller v. Schoeney
276 U. S. 272, 279-280 (1928); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S.,
at 632-633; cf. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 465
tives, imposes the most minimal of burdens on property holders, and takes
effect only after appellees have had sufficient notice of their need to comply
and a reasonable opportunity to do so. That the filing requirement meets
these standards is sufficient, under Texaco, to make it a reasonable restriction on the continued retention of the property right.

108

OCTOBER TERM, 1984
Opinion of the Court

471 U. S.

(1831) ("What right has any one to complain, when a reasonable time has been given him, if he has not been vigilant in
asserting his rights?")C
Finally, the Act provides appellees with all the process
that is their constitutional due. In altering substantive
rights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a
legislature generally provides constitutionally adequate process simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the
extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those
within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to
familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements. Texaco, 454
U. S., at 532; see also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett,
321 U. S. 233, 243 (1944); Nmih Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). Here there can be no doubt
that the Act's recording provisions meet these minimal requirements. Although FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners
of existing claims, such as appellees, were not required to
make an initial recording until October 1979. This 3-year
period, during which individuals could become familiar with
the requirements of the new law, surpasses the 2-year grace
period we upheld in the context of a similar regulation of
mineral interests in Texaco. Moreover, the specific annual
filing obligation at issue in this case is not triggered until the
year after which the claim is recorded initially; thus, every
claimant in appellees' position already has filed once before
the annualfilingobligations come due. That these claimants
already have made onefilingunder the Act indicates that
they know, or must be presumed to know, of the existence of
the Act and of their need to inquire into its demands.16 The
* As a result, this is not a case in which individual notice of a statutory
change must be given because a statute is "sufficiently unusual in character, and triggered in circumstances so commonplace, that an average
citizen would have no reason to regard the triggering event as calling for
a heightened awareness of one's legal obligations.19 Texaco, 454 U. S., at
547 (BRENNAN, J M dissenting).
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requirement of an annual filing thus was not so unlikely to
come to the attention of those in the position of appellees as
to render unconstitutional the notice provided by the 3-year
grace period.17
Despite the fact that FLPMA meets the three standards
laid down in Texaco for the imposition of new regulatory
restraints on existing property rights, the District Court
seemed to believe that individualized notice of thefilingdeadlines was nonetheless constitutionally required. The District Court felt that such a requirement would not be "overly
burdensome" to the Government and would be of great
benefit to mining claimants. The District Court may well be
right that such an individualized notice scheme would be a
sound means of administering the Act.18 But in the regulation of private property rights, the Constitution offers the
courts no warrant to inquire into whether some other scheme
might be more rational or desirable than the one chosen by
Congress; as long as the legislative scheme is a rational way
of reaching Congress' objectives, the efficacy of alternative
routes is for Congress alone to consider. "It is enough to
say that the Act approaches the problem of [developing a
national recording system] rationally; whether a [different
notice scheme] would have been wiser or more practical
under the circumstances is not a question of constitutional
dimension." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U. S.,
at 19. Because we deal here with purely economic legislation, Congress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable
17

BLM does provide for notice and a hearing on the adjudicative fact of
whether the required filings were actually made, and appellees availed
themselves of this process by appealing, to the Department of Interior
Board of Land Appeals, the BLM order that extinguished their claims for
failure to make a timely filing.
18
In the exercise of its administrative discretion, BLM for the last several years has chosen to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several
months before the end of the year, according to the Government, these
notices state: a[Y]ou must file on or before 12/30 [of the relevant year].
Failure to file timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim
abandoned." Brief for Appellants 31-32, n. 22.
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to place a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to
make the national recording system work. See ibid.; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). The
District Court therefore erred in invoking the Constitution
to supplant the valid administrative scheme established by
Congress. The judgment below is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
concurring.
I agree that the District Court erred in holding that
§ 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(c), violates due process
by creating an "irrebuttable presumption" of abandonment.
Whatever the force of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973),
beyond the facts underlying that case, I believe that § 314(c)
comports with due process under the analysis of our later decision in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Because
I also believe that the statute does not otherwise violate the
Fifth Amendment and that the District Court-erred in its
alternative holding that substantial compliance satisfies the
filing requirements of § 314 and corresponding regulations, I
agree that the judgment below must be reversed. Nonetheless, I share many of the concerns expressed in the dissenting
opinions of JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE STEVENS. If the
facts are as alleged by appellees, allowing the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to extinguish active mining claims that
appellees have owned and worked for more than 20 years
would seem both unfair and inconsistent with the purposes
underlying FLPMA.
The Government has not disputed that appellees sought in
good faith to comply with the statutory deadline. Appellees
contend that in order to meet the requirements of § 314, they
contacted the BLM and were informed by agency personnel
JUSTICE O'CONNOR,
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that they could file the required materials on December 31,
1980. Appellees apparently relied on this advice and handdelivered the appropriate documents to the local BLM office
on that date. The BLM accepted the documents for filing,
but some three months later sent appellees a notice stating
that their mining claims were "abandoned and void" because
the filing was made on, rather than prior to, December 31,
1980. Although BLM regulations clarify the filing deadlines
contained in §314, the existence of those regulations does not
imply that appellees were unjustified in their confusion concerning the deadlines or in their reliance on the advice provided by BLM's local office. The BLM itself in 1978 issued
an explanatory pamphlet stating that the annual filings were
to be made "on or before December 31" of each year. Ante,
at 89-90, n. 7. Moreover, the BLM evidently has come to
understand the need to clarify the nature of the annual filing
requirement, because it now sends reminder notices every
year to holders of recorded mining claims warning them that
the deadline is approaching and that filings must be made on
or before December 30.
The unusual facts alleged by appellees suggest that the
BLM's actions might estop the Government from relying on
§ 314(c) to obliterate a property interest that has provided a
family's livelihood for decades. The Court properly notes
that the estoppel issue was not addressed by the District
Court and will be open on remand. Ante, at 89-90, n. 7. In
this regard, I merely note that in my view our previous decisions do not preclude application of estoppel in this context. In Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford
County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984), we expressly declined to
adopt "a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances
run against the Government." Id., at 60. Such a rule was
unnecessary to the decision in that case, and we noted our
reluctance to hold that "there are no cases in which the public
interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervail-
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ing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency,
honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government. " Id., at 60-61 (footnote omitted).
Although "it is well settled that the Government may not
be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant," id., at
60 (footnote omitted), we have never held that the Government can extinguish a vested property interest that has been
legally held and actively maintained for more than 20 years
merely because the private owners relied on advice from
agency personnel concerning a poorly worded statutory deadline and consequently missed a filing deadline by one day.
Thus, if the District Court ultimately determines that appellees reasonably relied on communications from the BLM in
making their annual filing on December 31, 1980, our previous decisions would not necessarily bar application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the fact that the
Court reverses the decision of the District Court does not establish that appellees must ultimately forfeit their mining
claims.
dissenting.
I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. I write
separately only because under the special circumstances of
this case I do not believe it necessary to decide what Congress actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in
believing that Congress intended to require filings on or before the next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more
reasonably, by the end of the calendar year itself, the statutory deadline is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional requirements. It simply fails to give property holders clear
and definite notice of what they must do to protect their
existing property interests.
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 86, the Government
since the 19th century has encouraged its citizens to discover
and develop certain minerals on the public lands. Under the
general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., an individual
who locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive possesJUSTICE POWELL,
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sion of the land for mining purposes and may extract and
sell minerals he finds there without paying a royalty to
the Federal Government. § 26. After making a valuable
mineral discovery, the claimant may hold the claim so long as
he performs $100 worth of assessment work each year. § 28.
If he performs certain additional conditions, the claimant
may patent the claim for a nominal sum and thereby obtain
further rights over the land and minerals. See § 29. Until
recently, there were no federal recordation requirements.
Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created
as to property rights on public lands, Congress enacted §314
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
90 Stat. 2769, 43 U. S. C. § 1744.l This provision required
existing claimholders to record their claims in order to retain
them. More specifically, it required that "within the threeyear period following October 21,1976 and prior to December
31 of each year thereafter," § 1744(a), claimholders file with
1

Section 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), states in its entirety:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
"(a) Filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21,1976 shall,
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection:
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of
assessment work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed report provided by
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground."
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the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a notice of
intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assessment
work, or a special form, §§ 1744(a)(1) and (2). Failure to
make either the initial or a subsequent yearly filing was to
"be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the
mining claim . . . ." § 1744(c).
Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of 10 unpatented mining
claims on federal land in Nevada. Appellees' predecessors
located these claims in 1952 and 1954, and appellees have,
since they purchased the claims in 1960, earned their livelihood by producing gravel and other building materials from
them. From 1960 to the present, they have produced approximately $4 million worth of materials. During the
1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and
other materials worth more than $1 million. In no sense
were their claims stale.
The Lockes fully complied with §314,s initial recordation
requirement by properlyfilinga notice of location on October
19, 1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the subsequent yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent
their daughter, who worked in their business office, to the
Ely, Nevada, office of the BLM. There she inquired into
how and when they shouldfilethe assessment notice and was
told, among other things, that the documents should be filed
at the Reno office "on or before December 31, 1980." 573
F. Supp. 472, 474 (Nev. 1983). Following this advice, the
Lockes hand-delivered their documents at the Reno office on
that date. On April 4, 1981, they received notice from the
BLM that their mining claims were "abandoned and void,"
App. to Juris. Statement 22a, because they had filed on,
rather than prior to, December 31.2 It is this 1-day differ*The notice from the BLM also stated that "[sjubject to valid intervening
rights of third parties or the United States void or abandoned claims or
sites may be relocated and, based on the new location date, the appropriate
instruments may be refiled within the time periods prescribed by the regulations." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. Unlike most claimants, however,
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ence in good-faith interpretation of the statutory deadline
that gives rise to the present controversy.
JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of circumstances that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress
drafted § 314 and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that
(i) the section does not clearly describe what must befiled,let
alone when it must befiled;(ii) BLM's rewording of the deadline in its implementing regulations, 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a)(l)
(1984), indicates that the BLM itself considered the statutory
deadline confusing; (iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM
recognized this possible confusion, even it had described the
section in a pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requiringfiling"on or before December 31"; (iv) BLM, charged with
enforcing the section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and
(v) irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day
before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the year
itself, creates "a trap for the unwary," post, at 123, As
JUSTICE STEVENS also states, these facts, particularly the
test, suggest not only that Congress drafted §314 inartfully
but also that Congress may actually have intended to require
filing "on or before," not "prior to," December 31. This is
certainly the more reasonable interpretation of congressional
intent and is consistent with all the policies of the Act,,
I do not believe, however, that given the special circumstances of this case we need determine what Congress actually intended. As the Court today recognizes, the Takings
Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power
to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 103-108. In Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), we identified one of the most
important of these limitations when we stated that "the State
has the power to condition the permanent retention of [a]
the Lockes were unable to relocate their claims because the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611 et seq., had withdrawn deposits of common building materials from coverage of the general mining laws. To
them, forfeiture meant not relocation and refiling, but rather irrevocable
loss of their claims—the source of their livelihood.
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property right on the performance of reasonable conditions
. • . ." Id., at 526 (emphasis added); accord, Jackson v.
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where
the [forfeiture] provisiofn]. . . may be so unreasonable as to
amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of
the court. . ."). Furthermore, conditions, like those here,
imposed after a property interest is created must also meet
due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976). These standards require,
among other things, that there be no question as to what
actions an individual must take to protect his interests.
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. Together the
Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the Government
from depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily.
In the present case there is no claim that a yearly filing
requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim arises
from the fact that the language "prior to December 31" creates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing
period ends.3 Given the natural tendency to interpret this
phrase as "by the end of the calendar year," rather than "on
or before the next-to-the-last day of the calendar year," I
believe this uncertainty violated the standard of certainty
'The Court believes it is "obligated to apply the 'prior to December 31'
language by its terms19 because "its meaning is clear." Ante, at 96. Such
clarity, however, is not to be found in the words themselves. Courts, for
example, have used these same words in similar contexts clearly to mean
"by the end of the year," e. g.f AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F. 2d 1096, 1108,
1115 (CA11983); Bay State Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 P. 2d 1, 2 (CA1
1982), or have contrasted them with other phrases such as "tf ]rom January
1>" NYSA-ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm'n of New
York Harbor, 732 F. 2d 292, 295, and n. 6 (CA2), cert denied, 469 U. S.
852 (1984), or "after December 31," Peabody Coal Co. v. Lcrwis, 708 F. 2d
266, 267, n. 3 (CA7 1983), in ways that strongly suggest this meaning.
Various administrative agencies have also followed this same usage in
promulgating their regulations. E.g., 24 CFR §570.423(b) (1984); 31
CFR §515.560(i) (1984); 40 CFR §52.1174 (1984).
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and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The statement in at least one of the Government's own publications
that filing was required "on or before December 31," Department of the Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal
Lands 10 (1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a
property interest because a property holder reasonably believed that under the statute he had an additional day to satisfy any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than terminating it for failure to satisfy these same conditions in an
unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185
U. S. 55, 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632-633
(1877). Although the latter may rest on impossibility, the
former rests on good-faith performance a day late of what
easily could have been performed the day before. Neither
serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of
property rights to the State.
I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the
property holder with more certainty and definiteness than
did §314 when he must fulfill any recording requirements
imposed after a property interest is created. Given the statutory uncertainty here, I wouldfinda forfeiture imposed for
filing on December 31 to be invalid.4
I accordingly dissent.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
The Court's opinion is contrary to the intent of Congress,
engages in unnecessary constitutional adjudication, and unjustly creates a trap for unwary property owners. First, the
choice of the language ''prior to December 31" when read in
4

Parties, of course, ordinarily are bound to the consequences of their failing strictly to meet statutory deadlines. This is true, for example, as to
statutes of limitations and otherfilingdeadlines clearly specified. Because
of the special circumstances JUSTICE STEVENS identifies and the constitutional concerns identified above, this case is unique.
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context in 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a)1 is, at least, ambiguous, and,
at best, 'the consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps
caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Con1

The full text of 43 U. S. C. § 1744 reads as follows:
"Recordation of Mining Claims
u
(a) Filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21,1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21,1976 shall,
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection:
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of
assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto.
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
"(b) Additional filing requirements
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by
the Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim
or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date
of location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
"(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely
filing
"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and
(b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandon-
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gress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it
should." * In my view, Congress actually intended to authorize an annualfilingat any time prior to the close of business on December 31st, that is, prior to the end of the calendar year to which the filing pertains.3 Second, even if
Congress irrationally intended that the applicable deadline
for a calendar year should end one day before the end of the
calendar year that has been recognized since the amendment
of the Julian Calendar in 8 B.C., it is clear that appellees
have substantially complied with the requirements of the
statute, in large part because the Bureau of Land Management has issued interpreting regulations that recognize subment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not
be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site.
a
(d) Validity of claims, waiver of assessment, etc., as unaffected
"Such recordation or application by itself shall not render valid any claim
which would not be otherwise valid under applicable law. Nothing in this
section shall be construed as a waiver of the assessment and other requirements of such law."
1
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 97 (1977)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
'This view was expressed at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute
in July 1977:
"It is plain that Congress intended the filing requirement to expire with
the last day of the year, but inartful draftsmanship requires all filings
under Subsection 314(a) of the Act to be made on or before December 30th.
Such is the result of the unfortunate use of the words 'prior to December
31/ And since December 31st bears no relationship to the assessment
year, which ends at noon on September 1st of each year, the statutory requirement that the locator shall file the necessary documents on or before
December 30th of each year following the calendar year in which a claim
was located, means that where a claim is located after noon on September
1st in any calendar year, the locator must file in the next full calendar year
a notice of intention to hold, because no assessment work requirement has
yet arisen.'* Sherwood, Mining-claim Recordation and Prospecting under
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 23 Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute 1, 25 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
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stantial compliance. Further, the Court today violates not
only the long-followed principle that a court should "not pass
on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided,"4 but also the principle that a court should
"not decide a constitutional question if there is some other
ground upon which to dispose of the case."6
I
Congress enacted §314 of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act to establish for federal land planners and
managers a federal recording system designed to cope with
the problem of stale claims, and to provide "an easy way of
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or
invalid mining claim locations."6 I submit that the appellees' actions in this case did not diminish the importance of
these congressional purposes; to the contrary, their actions
were entirely consistent with the statutory purposes, despite
the confusion created by the "inartful draftsmanship" of the
statutory language.7
A careful reading of §314 discloses at least three respects
in which its text cannot possibly reflect the actual intent of
Congress. First, the description of what must befiledin the
initial filing and subsequent annual filings is quite obviously
garbled. Read literally, § 314(a)(2) seems to require that a
4

United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27 (1980).
* Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam); see also Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
•S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 (1975). The Court agrees regarding the
first purpose, but inexplicably and without citation concludes that another
purpose of § 314 is "to provide federal land managers with up-to-date information that allows them to make informed management decisions."
Ante, at 87. This latter statutory "purpose" is not mentioned in the legislative history; rather, it is a variation of a "purpose," equally without
citation, offered by appellants. See Brief for Appellants 45, 47.
7
See n. 3, supra.
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notice of intent to hold the claim and an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim must be filed "on a detailed report provided by § 28-1 of Title 30." One must substitute the word "or" for the word "on" to make any sense at
all out of this provision. This error should cause us to pause
before concluding that Congress commanded blind allegiance
to the remainder of the literal text of § 314.
Second, the express language of the statute is unambiguous in describing the place where the second annual filing
shall be made. If the statute is read inflexibly, the owner
must "file in the office of the Bureau" the required docu-^
ments.8 Yet the regulations that the Bureau itself has^
drafted, quite reasonably, construe the statute to allow filing
in a mailbox, provided that the document is actually received
by the Bureau prior to the close of business on January 19th
of the year following the year in which the statute requires
the filing to be made.' A notice mailed on December 30,
1982, and received by the Bureau on January 19, 1983, was
filed "in the office of the Bureau" during 1982 within the
meaning of the statute, but one that is hand-delivered to the
office on December 31, 1982, cannot be accepted as a 1982
"filing."
The Courtfindscomfort in the fact that the implementing
regulations have eliminated the risk of injustice. Ante, at 94.
But if one must rely on those regulations, it should be apparent that the meaning of the statute itself is not all that obvi•See 43 U . S . C . § 1744(a)(2).
•Title 43 CFR §3833.0-5(m) (1984) provides:
44
Tiled orfile*means being received and date stamped by the proper BLM
office. For the purpose of complying with § 3833.2-1 of this title, timely
filed' means being filed within the time period prescribed by law, or received by January 19th after the period prescribed by law in an envelope
bearing a clearly dated postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service within the period prescribed by law. This 20 day period does not apply
to a notice of location filed pursuant to §3833.1-2 of this title. (See
§ 1821.2-2(e) of this title where the last day falls on a date the office is
closed.)"
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ous. To begin with, the regulations do not use the language
"prior to December 31"; instead, they use "on or before
December 30 of each year."l0 The Bureau's drafting of the
regulations using this latter phrase indicates that the mean*
ing of the statute itself is not quite as "plain," ante, at 93, as
the Court assumes; if the language were plain, it is doubtful
that the Bureau would have found it necessary to change the
language at all. Moreover, the Bureau, under the aegis of
the Department of the Interior, once issued a pamphlet
entitled "Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands" that
contained the following information:
"Owners of claims or sites located on or before Oct. 21,
1976, have until Oct. 22,1979, to file evidence of assessment work performed the preceding year or to file a
notice of intent to hold the claim or site. Once the claim
or site is recorded with BLM, these documents must be
filed on or before December 31 of each subsequent year.79'
Id., at 9-10 (1978) (emphasis added).
"Plain language," ante, at 93, indeed.
There is a more important reason why the implementing
regulations cannot be supportive of the result the Court
reaches today: the Bureau's own deviation from the statutory
language in its mail-filing regulation. See n. 9, supra. If
the Bureau had issued regulations expressly stating that a
*43 CFR S3833.2-l(b)(l) (1984). It is undisputed that the regulations
did not come to the attention of the appellees. To justify the forfeiture in
this case on the ground that appellees are chargeable with constructive
notice of the contents of the Federal Register is no more acceptable to me
today than it would have been to Justice Jackson in 1947. "To my mind, it
is an absurdity to hold that every farmer who insures his crops knows what
the Federal Register contains or even knows that there is such a publication. If he were to peruse this voluminous and dull publication as it is issued from time to time in order to make sure whether anything has been
promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance,
for he would never get time to plant any crops." Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 387 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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December 31filingwould be considered timely—just as it has
stated that a mailfilingreceived on January 19 is timely—it
is inconceivable that anyone would question the validity of its
regulation. It appears, however, that the Bureau has more
power to interpret an awkwardly drafted statute in an enlightened manner consistent with Congress' intent than does
this Court.11
In light of the foregoing, I cannot believe that Congress
intended the words "prior to December 31 of each year" to be
given the literal reading the Court adopts today. The statutory scheme requires periodic filings on a calendar-year
basis. The end of the calendar year is, of course, correctly
described either as "prior to the close of business on December 31," or "on or before December 31," but it is surely
understandable that the author of §314 might inadvertently
use the words "prior to December 31" when he meant to refer
to the end of the calendar year. As the facts of this case
demonstrate, the scrivener's error is one that can be made in
good faith. The risk of such an error is, of course, the greatest when the reference is to the end of the calendar year.
That it was in fact an error seems rather clear to me because
no one has suggested any rational basis for omitting just one
day from the period in which an annual filing may be made,
and I would not presume that Congress deliberately created
a trap for the unwary by such an omission.
* "The Court, ante, at 102-103, n. 14, criticizes my citation of the BLM
regulations to demonstrate that the agency has itself departed from the
"plain" statutory language by allowing mail filings to be received by January 19th. In the same breath, the Court acknowledges that the agency is
not bound by the "plain" language in "administering the statute." Ibid.
The mail-delivery deadline makes it clear that the Court's judicially created "up-to-date" statutory purpose is utterly lacking in foundation. The
agency's adoption of the January 19 deadline illustrates that it does not
need the information by December 30; that it is not bound by the language
of the provision; and that substantial compliance does not interfere with
the agency's statutory functions or with the intent of Congress.

124

OCTOBER TERM, 1984
STEVENS,

J., dissenting

471 U. S.

It would be fully consistent with the intent of Congress to
treat any filing received during the 1980 calendar year as a
timelyfilingfor that year. Such an interpretation certainly
does not interfere with Congress' intent to establish a federal
recording system designed to cope with the problem of stale
mining claims on federal lands. The system is established,
and apparently, functioning.12 Moreover, the claims here
were active; the Bureau was well aware that the appellees
intended to hold and to operate their claims.
Additionally, a sensible construction of the statute does not
interfere with Congress' intention to provide "an easy way of
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or
" Several amid havefiledmaterials listing numerous cases in which it is
asserted that the Bureau is using every technical construction of the statute to suck up active mining claims much as a vacuum cleaner, if not
watched closely, will suck up jewelry or loose money. See Brief for Mountain States Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 2 (claiming that an "overwhelming number of mining claims have been lost to the pitfalls of section
314"), 3 (claiming that from 1977 to 1984 "unpatented mining claimants lost
almost 20,000 active locations due to the technical rigors and conclusive
presumption of section 314"); App. 1-86 (listing cases); Brief for Alaska
Miners Association, California Mining Association, Nevada Mining Association, Miners Advocacy Council, and Placer Miners Association as Amid
Curiae, Exhibit A (letterfromBureau's Utah State Office stating that well
over 1,400 claims were invalidated from 1979-1983 because § 1744(aXD
filings were made on December 31), Exhibit B (letter from Bureau's Billings, Montana Office stating that 198 claims were invalidated from 19791983 because § 1744(a)(1) filings were made on December 31), Exhibit C
(letter from Bureau's Wyoming State Office stating that 11 claims were
invalidated in 1980-1982 because § 1744(aX2)filingswere made on December 31), Exhibit D (letter from Bureau's Arizona State Office stating that
"approximately 500 claims have been invalidated due tofilingan affidavit
one day late"); Brief for Mobil Oil Corporation as Amicus Curiae 2-4
(claiming to be in a situation similar to the appellees'). According to
the Bureau's own calculations, thousands of active mining claims have
been terminated because filings made on December 31 were considered
untimely. These representations confirm the picture painted by amid
of a federal bureaucracy virtually running amok, and surely operating
contrary to the intent of Congress, by terminating the valuable property
rights of hardworking, productive citizens of our country.
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invalid mining claim locations."13 The Bureau in this case
was well aware of the existence and production of appellees'
mining claims; only by blinking reality could the Bureau
reach the decision that it did. It is undisputed that the
appellees made the first 1980 filing on August 29, 1980, and
made the second required filing on December 31, 1980; the
Bureau did not declare the mining claims "abandoned and
void" until April 4, 1981. Thus, appellees lost their entire
livelihood for no practical reason, contrary to the intent of
Congress, and because of the hypertechnical construction of a
poorly drafted statute, which an agency interprets to allow
"filings" far beyond December 30 in some circumstances, but
then interprets inflexibly in others.14 Appellants acknowledge that "[i]t may well be that Congress wished to require
filing by the end of the calendar year and that the earlier
deadline resulted from careless draftmanship." Brief for
Appellants 42, n. 31. I have no doubt that Congress would
have chosen to adopt a construction of the statute that filing
take place by the end of the calendar year if its attention
had been focused on this precise issue. Cf. DelCostello v.
Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151, 158 (1983).16
»S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 (1975).
14
The Court suggests that appellees' failure to file by December 30
"caused the property right to be extinguished." Ante, at 107. However,
the Court, on the one hand, carefully avoids mentioning the 3-month period
that elapsed after December 31 before the Bureau declared the appellees'
mining claims abandoned, and, on the other hand, describes the Bureau as
needing "up-to-date information that allows them to make informed land
management decisions." Ante, at 87, 107.
li
The Court, ante, at 96-97, n. 12, lists several provisions in the United
States Code as supportive of its position that "prior to December 31" is
somehow less ambiguous because of its occasional use in various statutory
provisions. It then states that it 'Is unclear whether the arguments advanced by the dissenters are meant to apply to ail of the provisions, or only
to some of them." Ibid. However, the provisions cited for support illustrate the lack of justification for the Court's approach, and highlight the
uniqueness of the provision in this case. Eleven of the provisions refer to
a one-time specific date; the provision at issue here requires specific action
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II
After concluding its constitutional analysis, the District
Court also held that 'the standard to be applied to assessment notice requirements is substantial compliance. Measured against this, the Lockes have satisfied their statutory
duties under Section 1744 by filing their notices one day
late."ls The District Court grounded its holding on this
Court's analysis in Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U. S. 48
(1970).
In Hickel, the Court construed 30 U. S. C. §28, which
reads:
"On each claim located after the 10th day of May 1872,
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less than
$100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements
on a continual annual basis, thus involving a much greater risk of creating a
trap for the unwary. Further, each of the specific dates mentioned in the
11 provisions is long past; thus, contrary to the Court's premise, this decision would have no effect on them because they require no future action.
See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5) ("prior to December 31, 1937"); 12 U. S. C.
§ 1709)(o)(l)(E) ("prior to December 31, 1976"); 12 U. S. C. § 1823(g)
("prior to December 31, 1950"); 12 U. S. C. § 1841(a)(5)(A) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 26 U. S. C. § 503(d)(1) ("prior to December 31, 1955");
33 U. S. C. §1319(aX5XB) ("prior to December 31, 1974"); 42 U. S. C.
§41«aX7)(E)(ii) (198£ed., Supp. Ill) ("prior to December 31, 1983"); 42
U. S. C. § 1962d-17(b) ("prior to December 31, 1969"); 42 U. S. C. § 5614
(b)(5) ("after the first year following October 3, 1977, prior to December
31"); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1982"); 42 U. S. C.
§ 7521(b)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 50 U. S. C. App. § 1741(b)(1)
("prior to December 31, 1946"). The remaining provision cited as authority by the Court, 22 U. S. C. § 3784(c), states that the Panama Canal and
certain other property "shall not be transferred to the Republic of Panama
prior to December 31, 1999." The legislative history indicates that that
language was added to make "clear that the President is not authorized to
accelerate the final transfer of the Panama Canal in 1999, as provided by
the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977." H. R. Con£ Rep. No. 96-473, p. 61
(1979). The Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, Art. II, indicates that it "shall
terminate at noon, Panama time, December 31,1999." Therefore, the language of § 3784(c) was tailored to a unique treaty provision.
li
573 F. Supp. 472, 479 (Nev. 1983).
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made during each year.. . . [UJpon a failure to comply
with these conditions, the claim or mine upon which
such failure occurred shall be open to relocation in the
same manner as if no location of the same had ever been
made, provided that the original locators, their heirs,
assigns, or legal representatives, have not resumed work
upon the claim after failure and before such location."
(Emphasis added.)
Recognizing that a claimant's "possessory title" should not be
disturbed on "flimsy or insubstantial grounds," 400 U. S., at
57, the Court wrote:
"We agree . . . that every default in assessment work
does not cause the claim to be lost. Defaults, however,
might be the equivalent of abandonment; and we now
hold that token assessment work, or assessment work
that does not substantially satisfy the requirements of 30
U. S. C. §28, is not adequate to 'maintain' the claims
within the meaning of § 37 of the Leasing Act. To hold
otherwise would help defeat the policy that made the
United States, as the prospective recipient of royalties, a
beneficiary of these oil shade claims. We cannot support
\Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306 (1930),] and [Ickes v.
Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U. S. 639
(1935)], on so broad a ground. Rather, their dicta to
the contrary, we conclude that they must be confined to
situations where there had been substantial compliance
with the assessment work requirements. . . . " Ibid.
Hickel thus demonstrates that the District Court was correct that substantial-compliance analysis was appropriate in
this case, and that appellees substantially complied with the
statute. Appellees earned their livelihood since 1960 by
mining the 10 unpatented mining claims now in dispute.17
They paid income taxes, and property and production taxes
to the State of Nevada, which appears as an amicus in sup/d., at 474.
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port of appellees. The statute, passed in 1976, required
appellees to register their mining claims 'In the office where
the location notice or certificate is recorded" and 'in the office
of the Bureau" by October 21, 1979; it is not disputed that
appellees met the statute's two initial filing requirements.18
Moreover, the statute required, within three years of October 21, 1976, that appellees file In the office of the Bureau
designated by the Secretary a copy of the official record of
the notice of location or certificate of location." w Appellees
also met this third requirement, thus completely informing
the Bureau of the existence, the sizes, the locations, and the
ownership of appellees' active mining claims. After the
three initial filing requirements, the statute required that
appellees make two separate annualfilings:(1) an initial filing
with the county recorder; and (2) a copy of the official record
of thefirstfilingfiledwith the Bureau. Appellees made the
first of thesefilingsfor the 1980 calendar year on August 29,
1980. Because 1980 was generally the first year that claimants—including appellees—had to comply with the annual
filing requirements that the new legislation mandated, the
Bureau began the practice of mailing reminder notices about
the filing due in the Bureau's office. Appellants acknowledge that appellees did not receive a reminder notice.20 Nevertheless, appellees responsibly inquired about the date of
filing with the Bureau for the 1980 calendar year; it is undisputed that Bureau personnel informed them that the filing
was due "on or before December 31,1980. "n On December
31, 1980, appellees made a 700-mile round trip from Ely to
Reno, Nevada, to hand-deliver their filings to the Bureau.
The Bureau accepted the filings on that date.
In my view, this unique factual matrix unequivocally contradicts the statutory presumption of an intent to abandon by
"Ibid.
"43U. S. C. § 1744(b).
"Reply Brief for Appellants 13, n. 12.
a
Affidavit of Laura C. Locke 13.
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reason of a late filing. In sum, this case presents an ambiguous statute, which, if strictly construed, will destroy valuable
rights of appellees, property owners who have complied with
all local and federal statutory filing requirements apart from
a 1-day "late" filing caused by the Bureau's own failure to
mail a reminder notice necessary because of the statute's
ambiguity and caused by the Bureau's information to appellees that the date on which the filing occurred would be
acceptable- Further, long before the Bureau declared a
technical "abandonment," it was in complete possession of all
information necessary to assess the activity, locations, and
ownership of appellees' mining claims and it possessed all
information needed to carry out its statutory functions. Finally, the Bureau has not claimed that the filing is contrary to
the congressional purposes behind the statute, that the filing
affected the Bureau's land-use planning functions in any manner, or that it interfered 'in any measurable way" with the
Bureau's need to obtain information.22 A showing of substantial compliance necessitates a significant burden of proof;
appellees, whose active mining claims will be destroyed contrary to Congress' intent, have convinced me that they have
substantially complied with the statute.
I respectfully dissent.

a

Brief for Appellants 46.
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43 §1743

PUBLIC LANDS

Ch. 35

Historical Note
References in Text This Act, referred to
in subsec. (aXl). (2), is Pub.L. 94-579, Oct.
21, 1976, 90 Stat 2743, as amended, known
as the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976. For complete classification of
this Act to the Code, see Tables volume.

Legislative History. For legislative history
and purpose of Pub.L. 94-579, see 1976 U.S.
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 6175.

West's Federal Forms
Sentence and fine, see § 7531 et seq.

§ 1744,

Recordation of mining claims
(a) Filing requirements

The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21,
1976, and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21, 1976 shall,
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection:
(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of
assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by
section 28-1 of Title 30, relating thereto.
(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of
the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to paragraph
(1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the mining
claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
(b) Additional filing requirements

The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or
mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. The
owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel site
located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date of
location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or
mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground.
(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely filing

The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b)
of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of
566
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§ 3833.0-5

43 CFR Ch. II (10-1-89 EdiHotty

patent under 30 U.S.C. 29 and 43 CFR
Part 3860 has not been issued.
(c) "Mill site" means any land located under 30 U.S.C. 42 for which patent
under 30 U.S.C. 42 and 43 CFR Part
3860 has not been issued.
(d) "Tunnel site" means a tunnel located pursuant to 30 U.S.C. 27.
(e) "Owner" means the person who
is the holder of the right to sell or
transfer all or any part of the unpatented mining claim, mill or tunnel
site. The owner shall be identified in
the instruments required by these regulations by a notation on those instruments.
(f) "Federal lands" means any lands
or interest in lands owned by the
United States, except lands within
units of the National Park System,
which are subject to location under
the General Mining Law of 1872,
supra, including, but not limited to,
those lands within forest reservations
in the National Forest System and
wildlife refuges in the National Wildlife Refuge System.
(g) "Proper BLM office" means the
Bureau of Land Management office
listed in § 1821.2-Kd) of this title as
having jurisdiction over the area in
which the claims or sites are located.
Notwithstanding the requirements of
§ 1821.2-Kd) of this title, filings made
under this subpart in Alaska may be
filed in either office in that State.
(h) "Date of location" or "located"
means the date determined by State
law in the local jurisdiction in which
the unpatented mining claim, mill or
tunnel site is situated.
(i) "Copy of the official record"
means a legible reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm, of the instrument which was or will be filed under
state law in the local jurisdiction
where the claim or site is located. It
also includes and exact reproduction,
duplicate, except microfilm, of an
amended instrument which may
change or alter the description of the
claim or site.
(j) "Affidavit of assessment work"
means the instrument required under
state law that certifies that assessment work required by 30 U.S.C. 28
has been performed on, or for the benefit of, a mining claim or, if state law
does not require the filing of such an

instrument, an affidavit evidencing
the performance of such assessment
work; and
.,*
(k) "Notice of intention to hold tt*
mining claim" means an Instrument
containing the information required Jn
§ 3833.2-3 of this title which has been
or will be filed under state law in the
local jurisdiction indicating that the
owner continues to have an interest-fa
the claim.
(1) "Notice of intention to hold a mill
or tunnel site" means an instrument
containing the information in the
form required in § 3833.2-3 of this title
indicating that the owner continues to
hold an interest in the site.
(m) "Filed or file" means being received and date stamped by the proper
BLM office. For the purpose of complying with §3833.2-1 of this title,
"timely filed" means being filed within
the time period prescribed by law, or
received by January 19th after the
period prescribed by law in an envelope bearing a clearly dated postmark
affixed by the United States Postal
Service within the period prescribed
by law. This 20 day period does not
apply to a notice of location filed pursuant to § 3833.1-2 of this title. (See
§ 1821.2-2(e) of this title where the
last day falls on a date the office is
closed.)
(n) "Assessment year" is defined in
30 U.S.C. 28 and commences at 12
o'clock noon on September 1st of each
year. For the purpose of complying
with the requirements of section
314(a) of the Act, the calendar year in
which the assessment year ends is the
year for which the evidence of annual
assessment work shall be filed.
(0) "Filing year" for the purposes of
complying with the Act begins on January 1st of each year and continues
through December 30th.
(p) "Amended location" means a location that is in furtherance of an earlier valid location and that may or
may not take in different or additional
unappropriated ground. An amendment may:
(1) Correct or clarify defects or omissions in the original notice or certificate of location; or
(2) Change the legal description,
mining claim name, position of discov-
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PATRICK J. GARVER (A1167)
DEREK LANGTON (A4068)
HAL J. POS (A4500)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME,
INC.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH MEMMOTT,
SUE BUSHNELL, SHEREE BUSHNELL,
JIM BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS,
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG SANDERS,

ORDER VACATING PRIOR
RULING AND JUDGMENT
REGARDING PARTIES' CROSS
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 7975
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

The parties in the above-entitled action brought cross
motions for summary judgment on the quiet title claims asserted
by each party.

On September 30, 1986, the Court, after having

considered the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, and
responses to written discovery, issued a "Ruling on Plaintiffs'
First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendants'
Motion

for Summary Judgment", denying Plaintiffs' Motions for

Summary Judgment and granting, in part, Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said ruling, and the parties then submitted additional
memoranda with respect thereto.

On January 2, 1987, the Court,

after having reviewed the additional memoranda, issued a "Ruling
on Plaintiffs1
Ruling"

Motion

in which

for Relief

From and Reconsideration of

the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to set

aside the Court's Ruling of September 30, 1986, pursuant to Rule
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that
the Court, in its Ruling of September 30, 1986, had improperly
relied on the current version of the federal regulation defining
"copy"
S

as

used

3833.0-5(i)),

in

43

rather

U.S.C.
than

the

S

1744

version

(i.e.,
of

said

43

C.F.R.

regulation

(hereinafter referred to as "the 1979 version" of said regulation) that was in effect from March 16, 1979 through and including October

21, 1979, which was the deadline for filing the

documents required pursuant to 43 U.S.C. S 1744(b).
In its Ruling of January 2, 1987, the Court set aside
its earlier Ruling of September 30, 1986.

Further, the Court

denied Plaintiffs' First Motion for Summary Judgment, except that
the Court determined that Plaintiffs had submitted "other evidence, acceptable to the proper BLM office, of such instrument of
recordation", in accordance with the 1979 version of 43 C.F.R.
S 3833.0-5(i), and therefore, the Court found that Plaintiffs had

-2-

complied with 43 U.S.C. S 1744(b), and, on that basis, granted
partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' First Motion for Summary
Judgment as to that issue only.

The Court further determined

that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Plaintiffs had complied with 43 U.S.C. S 1744(a) with respect to
whether

Plaintiffs

have properly maintained

their

"Red Dome*

mining claims by performing the required assessment work.

The

Court further found that there remained genuine issues of material

fact

concerning

Plaintiffs'

Second

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and therefore, denied said motions.
Subsequently, on February 17, 1987, Defendants filed
their

Motion

Summary

to Vacate

Judgment

Ruling

in Favor

of

and Judgment
Plaintiffs

Granting

Partial

in which Defendants

sought to have the Court vacate its Ruling of January 2, 1987 on
a number

of grounds.

The parties

then submitted

memoranda with respect to said Motion.

additional

After full consideration

of said memoranda, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court
issued its Ruling [regarding Defendants' Motion to Vacate Ruling
and

Judgment

Granting

Partial

Plaintiffs], dated April

Summary

Judgment

20, 1987, which

in Favor of

is on file

in the

records of this action and is incorporated herein by this reference.

In accordance therewith
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defen-

dants' Motion

to Vacate Ruling

-3-

and Judgment Granting Partial

Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs is hereby granted, and
accordingly, the Court's Ruling of January 2, 1987, and the Order
entered

in connection therewith

(denominated "Order of Relief

From and Reconsideration of Ruling; Partial Summary Judgment"),
dated

February

5, 1987, are hereby vacated.

Additionally,

because the Court has determined, as set forth more particularly
in its Ruling of April 20, 1987, that there are genuine issues of
material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs have complied with the
requirements of 43 U.S.C. S 1744(a) and

(b), it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' First and Second Motions for Summary
Judgment, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, are hereby
y

denied.
ENTERED this 1*3

day of / > ^ ^

. 1987.

BY THE

RAY M. HARDING
District Court Judgl

-4-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The foregoing ORDER VACATING PRIOR RULING AND JUDGMENT
REGARDING PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
prepared by Derek Langton, of and for Parsons, Behle & Latimer,
attorneys

for Defendants, and was, prior to execution by the

Court, submitted

to the following by mailing a copy thereof,

postage prepaid, this

day of April, 1987:

Dexter L. Anderson, Esq.
S.R. Route 52
Fillmore, Utah 84631
Robert G. Pruitt, Jr., Esq.
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER
36 South State Street
Beneficial Life Tower Building
Suite 1850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

78^
321:042987A
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OF PLACER CUklM
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN* that the undersigned located and now claim the
following described placer mining ground* containmg__JL&i2£
or less* situated m unknown
State nf
Utah
the ground as follows:*

Mining District*___JLlllard

fi.T-W.H.

BJ1 .

County*

and being more particularly described and marked on

H 1/2 of NK 1/lt «4> g ^ ,
Ranya 6 Wgg-h

acres* more

26 and Stt l/2i rrf» ST?, ^ / k „r V » ,

2 ? T o w n s h i p 71 Sr,n+R

^ n 4 a U 4 H C V f o , ? * a c r e s mnvft rvt» l ^ a .

,.mw« »o '"'

mum**.

exiatem and ttnagna m <»

I have been nw

£5

5P
;o>

*
v^>

^

(=

— -*o

This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals.
This claim is named the

Fwa.th«r T.i+» y*j_ *\

Placer Mining Claim.
Located this.

.day

ftf

^ 19 ft ,

Wnvnnihov

NAMES OF LOCATORS
Sandva f» ^ w r ^ i .

ShrtTttt -Rn^hnnll

.?nr ^iTahnftll

Prftt.t, .Sanriprs

J i n iiishnp.n

Pa^ Sanctorsr.V**rr

«i.tnri»vg

Sandra
fni/n*rr,

MernmcrfjUUh

WW

(*In this description* refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to
stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.)
BLANK NO._2f—Q otM r r o . co — sais so 2«oo CAST — SALT UAHC CITY

OF PLACER CLMM
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the undersigned located and now claim the
following described placer mining ground* containing
or less, situated m

unknown

State of Utah
the ground as follows:*
SE l/b

n f MV Ifo

Mining District

125«*ffl

acres, more

Finland

County,

and being more particularly described and marked on

*nH M 1J9 n^ WW 1 Ai, r>f W ^ n n 9 * T n ^ M p

R*ng» fs WAR*. S ^ L . H . M .

ftftnt.a1wing

t^.Ufl

21 S m i t h

a ^ > M movr> n y l e s s .

.MUTsuR. Hi M Utah Stoto Office*

This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals.
This claim is named *h*

F^ath^r i.it« Mo. 2

Placer Mining Claim.
Located t h i s _ _ l i L

.day of Noyfinber

_19_S3-.

NAMES OF LOCATORS
Sandra, rftwwott.

ShftVRR Bushmill

Snr> Piiwhnf.11

firatt Sanrinrs

jy» gushnell
Pag Sandra
Craig Sandors
2 9 ^ ^ ^ ^ description, refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to
stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.)
B L A N K NO. 2 » — O C»M rro co — axis so atoo «A»T — »ACT UAMK CITY

OF PLACER CLAIM
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the undersigned located and now claim the
following described placer mining ground* gnntaining
or less* situated m

unknown

State of
Utah
the ground as follows:*
S 1/2

Mining District*

acres* more

Millard

County*

and being more particularly described and marked on

Of SW 1/fr and NR l/U

rMT(=ptQR

lfrq.Ufl

rrF Stf 1/U. „r

g—

T\

T ^ « M p

91 fl*n+h

BLM Utah State Office

^ , r a n d images of al«docum«,.i..
have twan miorofflmwrtj.

*»*

eP-

1

ra^**

\rt

vF*
:=.

<=> iT02

-•=

-rn—ufTn

«> fir

This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals.
This claim is named the

F^-hboy T ^ « iin. j

Placer Mining Claim.
Located this

Ik.

.day oL

^ 19 ft? ,

Nnvnnt'hgvt*

NAMES OF LOCATORS
Sandra K*mmn+/fc
Su* V i i s h n « n

ShftlH

J i m *-*uahn»11

BrRt.t. fiarrlp?^

Piighnoll

P a n ^ a nH *»i*«

Crai f S «*»*'"««

(*In this description* refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to
stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.)
^ J « - A N K ^ I O . 2 t — - O OKM *YO. CO. — 31IS SO. 2«00 CAST — SACT IAKC CITY

OF PLACER CLA1BW
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the undersigned located and now claim the
following described placer mining ground, containing
or less, situated in_iinkiiQHi3
State of
Utah
the ground as follows:*

126 • 85

Mining District,,

acres, more

Klllart!

County,

and being more particularly described and marked on

HW 1 f t of SW 1ft nf Sftr?, ?3 arti SE 1ft nf SK i f t of Sfin, ?2 anri NK 1 f t
Of NE 1 f t o f Spft. 27 TnvnaMp 21 Snn+.h Bang* A tfA«+. S.T..-R.M. ^ t i t ^ n l n c
126.8*1 acres mora or 1n«a.

iNTFRlOR, BLM Utah State OTIice
Data relative to this document
hao been eiuww) into an automated
, S y S < e f n - a n d i m a g e s o f a" docum»nt«
iiava oeen microfilmed"

-«50 m

d _

Q

-»i ^5

as

0 0

-«3-

This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals.
This claim is named th«

TPwKhor

IA+.» H».

h.

Placer Mining Claim.
Located this

1^_

. d a y of

MnvotnVu>v»

-,19_Sl.

NAMES OF LOCATORS
Sanflra BflMiott
Sue Susfr.nll

T*r»+.+. SanrlftrR

Jim R»shnftH

?9n Sanrinra
Cra1c ffanrifivs

(*In this description, refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to

31 stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.)
m

^*-^**

N ^ ^ 1 ' — O <»«" *TO. CO. — 3»l» SO. 2SOO CAST — SAUT UAH* CITY

OF PLACER CLAISV8
To Whom It May

Concern:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned citizens of the United States,
over the age of 21 years, have this day located under and in pursuance of and having complied with Sections 2329, 2330, 2331, of the-Revised Statutes of the United States, and the
laws of the State of

Utah

and the local laws and customs and regula-

tions of this district, have this day located the following described Placer Mining Ground,
situated in the.

unknown
.Millard

Mining District
County, State of.

U±ah

f

viz.:

..?6..3)x0..a/2~a£J!E.^

This claim is located upon a valuable deposit, bearing gold and other precious metals,
situated in.....Townahip.2L.SxMith..Bangfl..6..Waat
_
This claim shall be known as the
Keathcr..LU*..ao«...5.
Placer Mining Claim, and we intend to work the same in accordance with local customs
and rules uf miners in said mining district, and each of the undersigned have an undivided
1/5.
interest therein*
Located this
1^
day of.
November
19..J5Q.
NAMES OF LOCATORS
..8and3:a..ttemBiGt.fc

|

.SuR.Bus'an.ftU

I

...Jiw.Bushn.flU

J

_P^#Sa.ndejirs

I

tm.Cral£aaSanders.

|

Township

X? 21 SouL

N.rrsre

t /
7998

//
&40

640
*f%

ytarso*.

"tr-Mre.

7T.93

A
640

793**'

640

/"

> W

\
2

6&o

eao
Harare

7J.9S

640

misfit

*o*t Mt*f9e*r«9

\*€rfO%£.

-----

*os*

.ft. '

/*.
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IN R E P L Y R E F E R T O :

United States Department of the Interior
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS
4015 WILSON BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

22203

SANDRA MEMMOTT
(ON RECONSIDERATION)
IBLA 84-888
88 IBLA 379

Decided

July 24, 1986

Petition for reconsideration of Sandra Memmott, 88 IBLA 379 (1985),
upon motion submitted by appellant. UMC 58767 through UMC 58774.
Petition granted; BLM decision of August 21, 1984, vacated;
88 IBLA 379, reaffirmed as modified.
1.

Contests and Protests: Generally—Mining Claims: Abandonment—Mining Claims: Contests—Mining Claims: Recordation—Rules of Practice: Private Contests
Jurisdiction over disputes between rival mining claimants is reserved to the courts, and it is not for this
Department to decide whether one claimant has a better
right to a claim because of a rival claimant's alleged
failure to file the documents required under sec. 314
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982). A decision by BLM, written
in response to a request by a rival claimant that
claims be declared abandoned and void, and going to
the merits of the rival claimant's allegations may
properly be vacated by this Board.

APPEARANCES: Patrick J. Garver, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellantpetitioner; David K. Grayson, Esq., Department of the Interior, Office of
the Solicitor, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the Department of the Interiorrespondent; Dexter L. Anderson, Esq., Fillmore, Utah, for Red Dane, Inc., and
Gordon Griffith-respondents.
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MULLEN
This is a reconsideration of a decision of this Board dismissing an
appeal by Sandra Menmott (Memnott) from an August 21, 1984, decision by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) denying Memmott's request that certain claims
owned by Red Dane, Inc. (Red Dane), be declared abandoned and void. The

EXHIBIT "A

IBLA 84-888
88 IBLA 379
determination by this Board that the appeal should be dismissed is found at
Sandra Meiiitott, 88 IBLA 379 (1985).
Appellant had initially requested a declaration that Red Dane's mining
claims were conclusively deemed to be abandoned because of Red Dome's alleged
failure to comply with 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982). The Board found the matter
was not appropriate for consideration, as a private contest is not available.
Conpliance with 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982) can be determined frcm the record,
whereas 43 CFR 4.450-1 allows a party to "initiate proceedings to have the
claim of title or interest adverse to his claim invalidated for any reason
not shown by the records of the Bureau of Land Management." (Qnphasis added.)
Further, noting the Department is without authority to resolve the right of
possession to mining claims between rival claimants, we held BLM properly
rejected appellant's request for a ruling that the conflicting claims were
abandoned and void.
In her petition for reconsideration, appellant alleges the initial
action was not a private contest but was an appeal frcm an August 21, 1984,
determination of the Utah State Office, BLM, "declaring that the Red Dane
group of mining claims had been properly filed in conpliance with Section 314
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act [43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982)]."
Appellant alleges the Board's decision dismissing the appeal without reaching the merits is in error, because BU4 had made a determination that Red
Dome's filings were in conpliance with the mining claim recordation statutes.
Appellant argues that, by dismissing the appeal, the Board decision effectively precluded consideration of the merits of that determination, and she
will be faced with a final Department determination that Red Dane complied
with the mining claim recordation filing requirements in any attempt to
litigate this matter before a state court. We find seme merit in this contention.
Had BLM merely refused to take action on appellant's request, the matter
would properly be subject to dismissal. IMCO Services, 73 IBLA 374 (1983).
The BLM decision did more, however. The August 21, 1984, decision states, in
pertinent part:
According to our records, the Red Done and Red Dane
Nos. 1-7 placer mining claims were located 5/24/1935, 9/5/1946,
7/21/1936, 7/21/1936, 10/19/1936, 10/19/1936, 7/1/1938, 8/1/1938
respectively and the information received in this office
November 27, 1978 showing the claim name, date of location,
recording information, legal description, and the owners name
and address. Additional information was requested regarding the
land description for the Red Dane Claim Nos. 1, 4, and 7. This
information was received January 31, 1979, which was prior to the
October 22, 1979, filing date established by the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 for mining claims located prior
to the Act.
This evidence showing that a recording of the mining claims
had been made was accepted and made part of our records. The
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annual affidavits of assessment work performed have been timely
filed for each year since then. The Red Dane and Red Dome
Nos. 1-7 placer claims are considered in compliance with Section
314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.
Notice of transfer of interest should be filed with this
office within 60 days however, no penalty for failure to file
is assessed.
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, your
request that we declare the Red Dane mining claims invalid for
noncompliance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 is denied.
[1] As can be seen, rather than refusing to take action on appellant's request, as was the case in IMCO Services, supra, the BLM decision
addressed the merits of appellant's contentions. Doing so was contrary to
the stated policy of BLM that it "will not become the forum for the resolution of private party disputes between rival claimants." BLM Manual at
3833.41B. The Department has been consistent in its position that it is
without authority to determine the question of right of possession as to
claims between rival claimants. IMCO Services, supra; Gold Depository &
Loan Co. v. Mary Brock, 69 IBLA 194 (1982); W. W. Allstead, 58 IBLA 46
(1981); John R. Meadcws, 43 IBLA 35 (1979); John W. Pope, 17 IBLA 73 (1974).
While a determination regarding sufficiency of mining claim recordation
documents may be made by BLM and this Board, 1/ such determinations in
response to third party requests should be avoided. 2/ Therefore, BLM's
response to appellant's request should not have addressed the merits of the
appellant's contentions. For that reason, we find it appropriate to vacate
the August 21, 1984, BLM decision.
Having vacated the BLM decision without addressing the sufficiency or
correctness of that decision, we do not find it necessary to address the
other issues raised by Manroott.
Therefore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of Land
Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 CFR 4.1, the petition for

1/ See, e.g., Precious Minerals Unlimited, Inc., 61 IBLA 136 (1982); John J.
Vikarcik, 58 IBLA 377 (1981); Walter Everly, 52 IBLA 58 (1981); William E.
Talbott, 52 IBLA 12 (1981); W. C. Miles, 48 IBLA 214 (1980); Wilma
Hartley, 48 IBLA 83 (1980).
~2? We do not disparage the right of BLM on its own initiative to adjudicate
any mining claim in terms of compliance with section 314 of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982). Clearly, this is
BLM's responsibility in administering the statute. We note, however, that
upon review of the sufficiency of the section 314 filings for a claim, no
decision would ordinarily be issued approving the filings.

IBLA 84-888
88 IBLA 379
reconsideration i s granted? the August 2 1 , 1984, BLM decision i s vacated?
ard the Board's p r i o r decision in the m a t t e r , reported a t 88 IBLA 379 (1985),
i s hereby reaffirmed a s modified by t h i s d e c i s i o n .

4ullen
Administrative Judge
We concur:

C. Randall Grant, Jr
Administrative Judge

U Philip
Chief Administrative Judge
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Tab 2 A

§ 3862.1-3

4«< M Ui II ( 10-1-89 Edition)

§ 3862.1-3 Evidence of title.

(a) Each patent application must be
supported by either a certificate of
title or an abstract of title certified to
by the legal custodian of the records
of locations and transfers of mining
claims or by an abstracter of titles.
The certificate of title or certificate to
an abstract of title must be by a
person, association, or corporation authorized by the State laws to execute
such a certificate and acceptable to
the Bureau of Land Management.
(b) A certificate of title must conform substantially to a form approved
by the Director.
(c) Each certificate of title or abstract of title must be accompanied by
single copies of the certificate or
notice of the original location of each
claim, and of the certificates of
amended or supplemental locations
thereof, certified to by the legal custodian of the record of mining locations.
(d) A certificate to an abstract of
title must state that the abstract is a
full, true, and complete abstract of the
location certificates or notices, and all
amendments thereof, and of all deeds,
instruments, or actions appearing of
record purporting to convey or to
affect the title to each claim.
(e) The application for patent will be
received and filed if the certificate of
title or an abstract is brought down to
a day reasonably near the date of the
presentation of the application and
shows full title in the applicant, who
must as soon as practicable thereafter
file a supplemental certificate of title
or an abstract brought down so as to
include the date of the filing of the
application.
§3862.1-4 Evidence relating to destroyed
or lost records.
In the event of the mining records in
any case having been destroyed by fire
or otherwise lost, a statement of the
fact should be made, and secondary
evidence of possessory title will be received, which may consist of the statement of the claimant, supported by
those of any other parties cognizant of
the facts relative to his location, occupancy, possession, improvements, etc.;
and in such case of lost records, any
deeds, certificates of location or purchase, or other evidence which may be

in the claimant's possession and tend
to establish his claim, should be filed.
§ 3862.1-5 Statement required that land is
unreserved, unoccupied, unimproved
and unappropriated.
Each person making application for
patent under the mining laws, for
lands in Alaska, must furnish a duly
corroborated statement showing that
no portion of the land applied for is
occupied or reserved by the United
States, so as to prevent its acquisition
under said laws; that the land is not
occupied or claimed by natives of
Alaska; and that the land is unoccupied, unimproved and unappropriated
by any person claiming the same other
than the applicant.
§ 3862.2 Citizenship.
§ 3862.2-1 Citizenship of corporations and
of associations acting: through agents.
The proof necessary to establish the
citizenship of applicants for mining
patents must be made in the following
manner In case of an incorporated
company, a certified copy of its charter or certificate of incorporation must
be filed. In case of an association of
persons unincorporated, the statement
of their duly authorized agent, made
upon his own knowledge or upon information and belief, setting forth the
residence of each person forming such
association, must be submitted. This
statement must be accompanied by a
power of attorney from the parties
forming such association, authorizing
the person who makes the citizenship
showing to act for them in the matter
of their application of patent.
§ 3862.2-2 Citizenship of individuals.

(a) In case of an individual or an association of individuals who do not
appear by their duly authorized agent,
the statement of each applicant, showing whether he is a native or naturalized citizen, when and where born, and
his residence, will be required.
(b) In case an applicant has declared
his intention to become a citizen or
has been naturalized, his statement
must show the date, place, and the
court before which he declared his intention, or from which his certificate
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